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1. INTRODUCTION

On any given business day, thousands of civil depositions occur in law
offices and hotel conference rooms around the country. In the days before
these depositions, lawyers spend countless hours with witnesses-sometimes
more time than the depositions themselves-to prepare these witnesses to
testify. These preparation sessions are private and remain shielded from1
opponents and courts under the cloak of the attorney-client privilege.
However, basic ethical principles still govern these preparation sessions, even
if the extent of the lawyer's compliance with those principles remains
unknown. Most lawyers want to obey the standards of the profession, and this
is the reason that the ethical principles governing witness preparation require
careful study. This Article is directed to lawyers who take the rules of
professional conduct seriously and scholars who understand that solutions to
the problems of legal ethics are not mere abstractions, but an essential part of
practical professionalism.
Scholarly study of the ethical principles that govern the preparation of
deposition witnesses is almost non-existent. 2 Although trial is an infrequent
occurrence in civil cases, there exists a traditional but inaccurate paradigm that
views "the trial" as the natural and ordinary litigation end-game.3 Discussing
witness preparation influenced by this paradigm promotes a failure to address
the particular problems that arise in preparing deposition witnesses; yet,
because trials are uncommon, it is a mistake to regard depositions simply, or
even primarily, as devices for trial preparation. Rather, in most cases,
depositions play a critical role in posturing cases for settlement and in laying
the groundwork for dispositive pre-trial motions. Thus, if witness preparation
generally is "the 'dark secret' of the legal profession ... neither taught in law
school ... and rarely litigated or even discussed in scholarly literature," 4 this
failure to focus on depositions leaves unexamined the arena in which most
witnesses in civil cases actually testify.
A basic premise of this Article is that the ethical rules for preparing
deposition witnesses require their own analysis. Deposition testimony differs
from trial testimony primarily because the range of permissible inquiry at
1. DAVID M. MALONE ET AL., THE EFFECTIVE DEPOSITION 210 (3d ed. 2006).
2. See, e.g., Liisa Ren~e Salmi, Don't Walk the Line: Ethical Considerationsin Preparing
Witnesses for Deposition and Trial, 18 REV. LITIG. 135, 136 (1999) (noting that witness
preparation is not taught in law school nor is it a frequent topic in the secondary literature).
3. See, e.g., Christopher Lutz, Multi-Level Depositions, 16 LITIG. 9, 14 (1990) ("Never lose
sight of the fact that what you do in a deposition is subservient to your trial goals. You do not
develop information, on any level, just as a curiosity. It all must be fit into a trial plan.").
4. See Salmi, supra note 2, at 136 (citing John S. Applegate, Witness Preparation,68 TEX.
L. REV. 277, 279 (1989)).
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depositions greatly exceeds that which is admissible evidence at trial. The
scope of proper deposition inquiry is limited, not by the stringent criteria of
admissibility, but by the generous standard that the information sought must
only "appear [to be] reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence." Moreover, because judges are not present to supervise
depositions, and lawyers are permitted to instruct witnesses not to answer only
in limited circumstances, 6 witnesses must be prepared to answer questions that
a court would never permit at trial. Despite the pervasive and important nature
of deposition practice, the dearth of ethical guidance in this area forces many
lawyers to rely merely on the guidance of a mentor or ill-defined folklore.
This Article attempts to provide lawyers with a more useful framework for
navigating their way through these issues.
The Article makes three fundamental claims. First, it argues that the ethical
rules governing witness preparation reflect a single underlying moral principle
that we call the Anti-False Testimony Principle. Second, it argues that
deposition witnesses are required to give two fundamentally different kinds of
testimony: testimony about events that took place in the past, which we call
testimony about the historical record, and testimony about present
understandings of relevant issues. The third claim marries the first two claims,
maintaining that the Anti-False Testimony Principle operates differently
depending on the kind of testimony to be given, providing more substantial
limitations on testimony recounting the historical record than on testimony
about present understandings.
Part II of the Article provides a brief introduction to the scope of deposition
practice. Part III discusses the rules governing the actions lawyers are
permitted to take in preparing their witnesses to testify in depositions. This
Part argues that the various ethical rules reflect the more general, underlying
principle that we call the Anti-False Testimony Principle. Part IV elaborates
on the distinction between the two basic kinds of testimony that non-expert
witnesses are called on to give: testimony about the historical record and
testimony about present understandings. This distinction is critical, because as
Part V shows, a lawyer's ethical obligations vary considerably depending on
whether the witness is being prepared to testify about the historical record or
about present understandings. Part V-the core of the Article--explains the
various ways in which the Anti-False Testimony Principle applies. On one
hand, the Principle applies stringently when lawyers prepare witnesses to
testify about the historical record, which is testimony based on memories either
5. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
6. Generally, instructions not to answer are proper only to protect a privilege or an
assertion of protection under the work product doctrine or to enforce a court order. FED. R. C1V.
P. 30(c)(2) ("A person may instruct a deponent not to answer only when necessary to preserve a
privilege, to enforce a limitation ordered by the court, or to represent a motion under
Rule(d)(3).").
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of the witnesses' past perceptions or of their past mental states. On the other
hand, the application of the Principle is more limited when lawyers prepare
witnesses to testify about their present understandings, which relate to and
form a critical part of the litigation positions that the lawyers have been hired
to develop. Part VI concludes by summarizing the framework of various
ethical rules regarding deposition testimony.
1I.

THE IMPORTANCE AND BREADTH OF DEPOSITION PRACTICE

A. PreparationofDeposition Witnesses: A Pervasive Yet UnstudiedAspect of
Litigation Practice
Only about two percent of all civil cases filed actually go to trial.7 If a case
enters discovery-that is, except where it settles or is dismissed soon after it is
filed-witnesses are nearly always deposed.8 It follows that, by volume,
nearly all testimony given in civil disputes is offered during depositions. More
particularly, even when cases do go to trial, deposition practice will have been
critical, because competent counsel will have been careful to "lock in" the
testimony of key witnesses beforehand in their depositions. Thus, whether trial
occurs or not,
the critical time for preparing a witness is before his or her
9
deposition.

7. See JAMES C. DUFF, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2008
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 71 (2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2008/Judicial
Businespdfversion.pdf (noting that in the twelve-month period ending September 30, 2008, of the
233,826 cases filed in United States district courts, 4723 cases were disposed of during or after
trial-a total of approximately two percent).
8. See MALONE ET AL., supra note 1, at xiii-xiv (discussing the need for effectively taking
and defending depositions regardless of whether the case will go to trial).
9. See, e.g., DENNIS R. SUPLEE AND DIANA S. DONALDSON, THE DEPOSITION HANDBOOK
§ 102[B] (4th ed. 2002) (explaining that deposition testimony may be preserved regardless of its
potentially harmful nature). But see Charles Silver, PreliminaryThoughts on the Economics of
Witness Preparation, 30 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1383, 1387-89 (1999) (observing that "lawyers
probably prepare witnesses less often than commonly believed" and that "lawyers probably do
not prepare witnesses intensively") (emphasis added) (capitalization omitted). Professor Silver
cites little evidence for his assertion, and his observation is difficult to credit. Indeed, most
litigators know that bypassing the opportunity to prepare witnesses-and to prepare them
intensively-is foolhardy. See, e.g., Odone v. Croda Int'l PLC, 170 F.R.D. 66, 69 (D.D.C. 1997)
("An attorney has an ethical duty to prepare a witness."); see also Christy v. Pa. Tpk. Comm'n,
160 F.R.D. 51, 53 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (providing that communication between witnesses and counsel
prior to depositions is not limited; rather, it is encouraged as part of the lawyer's duty to prepare
deposition witnesses). It is not too much to say that spurning the opportunity to prepare key
witnesses is an invitation to malpractice and perhaps even triggers a duty on the part of the
lawyer's firm to notify its professional liability carrier. See generally 2 RONALD E. MALLEN &
JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 20:2-20:3 (2008 ed. 2008) (discussing the standard
of care and "parameters of competence" necessary for a lawyer to fulfill her ethical obligation of
representing a client with diligence and competence).
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Despite the abundance of "how-to" handbooks on taking and defending
depositions,10 scholarly commentary on a lawyer's ethical obligations in predeposition witness preparation is neither recent nor extensive.' Practitioneroriented works on deposition practice generally focus on subjects other than
ethical pre-deposition witness preparation, particularly on misconduct during
depositions, but some do discuss ethical considerations.12 The absence of
informed commentary is especially unfortunate, because there is-and
inevitably always will be-an absence of case law defining what lawyers can
properly do in preparing their witnesses, for the obvious reason that the
preparation3 of fact witnesses is protected from scrutiny by the attorney-client
privilege.'

This lack of guidance on pre-deposition witness preparation needs to be
remedied-and not simply for the general reason that a gulf between the
academic study of law and its practice disembodies the one and impoverishes
10.

See generally DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., DEPOSITION QUESTIONING STRATEGIES AND

TECHNIQUES (West Group 2001) (explaining strategies and techniques for conducting depositions
and deposition preparation); MALONE ET AL., supra note 1, at I (analyzing the mechanics of
taking and defending depositions); CHRIS MARTINIAK, HOW TO TAKE AND DEFEND DEPOSITIONS
xv (3d ed. 2002) (focusing on strategies, tactics, and other elements of deposition skills); SUPLEE
& DONALDSON, supra note 9 (providing general guidance on conducting depositions and general
deposition practice).
11. See generally Applegate, supra note 4; W. William Hodes, The ProfessionalDuty to
Horseshed Witnesses-Zealously, Within the Bounds of the Law, 30 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1343
(1999); Salmi, supra note 2, at 136-37; Richard C. Wydick, The Ethics of Witness Coaching, 17
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 1-3 (1995). Although specifically addressing trial testimony, see Joseph D.
Piorkowski, Note, ProfessionalConduct and the Preparationof Witnesses for Trial: Defining the
Acceptable Limitations of "Coaching," I GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 389 (1987) for a useful
discussion of witness preparation. For a further discussion of ethical witness coaching in the trial
context, see Fred C. Zacharias & Shaun Martin, Coaching Witnesses, 87 KY. L. J. 1001 (1999).
12. See, e.g., James M. Altman, Witness PreparationConflicts, 22 LITIG. 38, 38-41, 43, 6768 (1995) (outlining some ethical principles of witness deposition preparation); see also Clark R.
Hudson & Jackie M. Ni Mhairtin, PreparingYour Client for Deposition or Trial Testimony, 59
FED'N DEF. & CORPORATE COUNS. Q. 63, 63-69 (2008); James W. McElhaney, Be Careful in the
Woodshed, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2005, available at http://www.abajoumal.com/magazine/becareful
in the woodshed/print/; Henry Morrissette, Tips for Preparing Your Corporate Witness for
Deposition, 75 DEF. COUNS. J. 105, 105-08 (2008); Peter M. Panken & Mirande Valbrune,
Enforcing the ProhibitionsAgainst Coaching Deposition Witnesses, 17 PRAC. LITIG. 15, 15-18,
20, 22 (2006).
13. See MALONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 210. The attorney-client privilege applies when a
lawyer prepares his or her individual client for deposition. When a lawyer defends the deposition
of someone other than the client, an attomey-client relationship exists for the purpose of
providing legal representation in the deposition. This commonly occurs when a lawyer, who
represents a corporation and not individual corporate officers, defends the deposition of a
corporate employee. See MODEL RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2009). This is not,
however, the only circumstance; if the deposition of any non-party witness is sought, a lawyer
may represent that witness, and the scope of the engagement will be limited to the defense of the
deposition.
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the other. Although one commentator optimistically contends that "from a...
pragmatic perspective, false testimony rarely goes unnoticed,"1 4-a
proposition that every lawyer concerned with the maintenance of high ethical
standards in the profession hopes to be true-verifying the extent of the
unnoticed false testimony is logically impossible. Plainly stated, deposition
preparation is a secret process, and, absent a slip by the witness or counsel, or
the presence of an undetected recording device,' what has occurred during
deposition preparation will never come to the court's or bar's attention. The
consequence of this secrecy is that, practically speaking, lawyers are
essentially "on their honor" to prepare witnesses in accordance with ethical
standards, knowing that enforcement of such standards is rare. Lawyers of
high standards want to understand and uphold their duties even if they know
that, alas, some members of their profession may treat the secrecy of witness
preparation as a license to act improperly.
B. The Breadth ofDeposition Inquiry
Deposition preparation is important not only because of the frequency of
depositions, but also because of the breadth of deposition inquiry. Depositions
differ from trial testimony in three important respects. First, except on rare
occasions, deposition witnesses testify outside of the presence of a judge,
meaning that the proceedings are controlled by the interplay between the
lawyers and the conduct and attitude of the witness. Second, witnesses
primarily answer questions posed by the opposing party's counsel, which
essentially amounts to unrestrained cross-examination without the limitations
provided by the scope of a preceding direct examination.
The third reason that deposition testimony deserves to be treated differently
than trial testimony is that-except in the case of de bene esse depositions16
taken to preserve testimony for trial-the rules of evidence do not apply.
Thus, apart from the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine, or a
judicially-imposed restriction on the scope of discovery in the particular case,
deposition rules only limit the scope of examination by the broad and flexible
standard that the information sought be "reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence."' 7 Given its broad scope, deposition inquiry
regularly elicits information that would be inadmissible at trial, and competent
14. See Altman, supra note 12, at 38.
15. See In re Attorney Disciplinary Matter, 98 F.3d 1082, 1084-85 (8th Cir. 1996)
(affirming the disbarment of an attorney after a court reporter's device recorded a conversation
between an attorney and his client in which the attorney advised his client to commit perjury).
16. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (articulating the scope of discovery to include any relevant
information); see also MALONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 280 n.2 (referring only to Rule 804 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence as specifically applicable to de bene esse depositions).
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) ("Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the
discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.").
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lawyers must prepare their witnesses to respond to a broad array of questions.
This scope extends beyond the obvious statement that hearsay, though
generally excludable at trial, is regularly and appropriately elicited in
depositions. A witness may properly be asked to recount what he or she
perceived regarding events that took place at a relevant and generally definable
time in the past.1 8 Such testimony sometimes includes the witness's opinions
or inferences about those facts, which may be inadmissible. 19 Testimony about
the historical past can also recount states of mind that the witness can recall
experiencing at relevant times in the past-for example, the witness's own
state of mind when a contract was being signed or the reason the witness made
certain decisions while designing a product or treating a patient,
notwithstanding that such testimony may be inadmissible under the parolevidence rule.
But extended questioning that elicits inadmissible testimony about the
historical record is not the whole of it. Because the scope of a deposition is so
broad, deposition witnesses are often asked to testify about their present
understandings. For example, in complex commercial cases where the parties'
obligations flow from contracts, parties are regularly asked to describe their
present understanding of those obligations.
In other cases, including tort
cases, present understandings are relevant to whether past conduct can be
explained, excused, or justified.2 1 When witnesses offer testimony about
present understandings, they are doing something quite different from
reporting their present memories of past perceptions: they are describing their
current understanding of a certain aspect of the case. 22 The literature does not
explain how, if at all, the ethical rules of witness preparation differ in these two
situations-present memories of past perceptions or past mental states, and

18. On occasion, this Article will describe persons as "he" or "she." Generally, however, in
order to avoid confusion, we adopt the convention of using the feminine pronoun to refer to
lawyers who are either preparing, defending, or questioning witnesses, and the masculine pronoun
to refer to the witnesses themselves.
19. See FED. R. EVID. 701 (articulating the rule for opinion testimony by lay witnesses at

trial).
20. See, e.g., Minebea Co. v. Papst, 355 F. Supp. 2d 526, 530 (D.D.C. 2005) (stating that it
is appropriate to question a witness as to his present understanding of a contract term); see also
infra Part V.C. 1.
21. See infra Part V.C.l.
22. A third kind of testimony in both depositions and at trial is expert testimony.
Doctrinally speaking, expert testimony is not testimony about facts. Experts assist the trier of
fact-the jury or, in a bench trial, the judge-to understand facts that are thought to be beyond the
scope of a layperson's knowledge. See FED. R. EViD. 702, 706 (articulating the Federal Rules of
Evidence for "Testimony by Experts" and "Court Appointed Experts"). The special issues of
expert testimony and the preparation of experts for their depositions are beyond the scope of this
Article.
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present understanding. 23 Part V of this Article explains the different ethical
requirements that should govern preparing witnesses to give these two
different types of deposition testimony. The point here is that the preparation
of deposition witnesses is an important and identifiable field of study because
deposition practice regularly encompasses a broader range of questions than
those that are frequently permitted at trial.
III. THE ANTI-FALSE TESTIMONY PRINCIPLE AND THE MEANING OF "FALSE
TESTIMONY"

A. The Basic EthicalRequirements: The Components of the Anti-False
Testimony Principle
The fundamental ethical tenets affecting a lawyer's witness preparation
duties, which are equally applicable in deposition or at trial, are cast as two
prohibitions on the introduction of "false" testimony. Rule 3.4(b) of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) provides that "[a] lawyer shall
24
not... (b) falsify evidence, [or] counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely,"
and Rule 3.3(a) of the Model Rules requires that "[a] lawyer shall not
knowingly . . . (3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false."2 5
Although Model Rules 3.4(b) and 3.3(a)(3) apply in different situations, their
goal is the same-to prevent a lawyer from tampering (actively or passively)
with the factual record. Together, these rules reflect a fundamental and
underlying principle that aims to prevent lawyers from placing incorrect and
dishonest testimony in the record. We call this underlying concept the "AntiFalse Testimony Principle." Although the most problematic situations require
detailed discussion, 26 the Anti-False Testimony Principle generally imposes
three broad prohibitions on lawyers, all of which are designed to bar a lawyer
from gaining an advantage from dishonest litigation practices: (1) suborning

23. Two commentators notice, but do not develop, the significance of the fact that witnesses
testify about their "observations or opinions." See Applegate, supra note 4, at 304 (emphasis
added); see also Wydick, supra note 11, at 25 (developing two categories of witness testimony).
Professor Wydick distinguishes between, but does not elaborate on, the ethical significance of the
fact that a witness testifies "about either of two things: (a) the events in question or (b) what the
witness believes about the events in question." Wydick, supra note 11, at 25. Wydick further
discusses witness beliefs about their perceptions, offering examples of different categories of
"knowledge." Id. at 20-22.
24.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(b) (2009).

25. Id at R. 3.3(a)(3). Both Rule 3.3(a)(3) and Rule 3.4(b) can be read as specific iterations
of the general rule directed to the entire range of a lawyer's activities embodied in Rule 1.2(d):
"A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client in, conduct that a lawyer knows is
criminal or fraudulent." Id. at R. 1.2(d)
26. See infra Part V.B.3.
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perjury (for example, deliberately requesting a witness to testify falsely); 27 (2)
misleading or otherwise manipulating a witness into testifying inaccurately,
either when the lawyer knows the testimony is false or when the lawyer fails to
establish that the altered testimony is true;28 and (3) knowingly permitting a
witness to testify falsely, even when the lawyer played no role in procuring the
false testimony. 9 Each state has rules that articulate substantially the same
standards 3°-rules that apply equally to trial testimony and to
27. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from falsifying
evidence).
28. See infra Part V.B.I.b.
29. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a).
30. See AM. BAR ASS'N, CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, ABA MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: STATE ADOPTION OF MODEL RULES, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc
/model rules.html (indicating that every state, other than California, imposes professional
conduct rules similar to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct). Despite this widespread
adoption of the Model Rules, however, a small minority of the individual states' rules on false
testimony show material variances from the Model Rules. For instance, Florida's Rule 4-3.4(b)
notes that "[a] lawyer shall not fabricate evidence, [or] counsel or assist a witness to testify
falsely," but the Rule does not offer an explanation as to any substantive or intended effect of
Florida's use of the word "fabricate" instead of "falsify" as used in the ABA's Model Rules. 35
FLA. STAT. ANN. R. 4-3.4(b) (2008) (emphasis added) (codifying the Florida Rules of
Professional Conduct). New York's Rule 3.4 is substantially different from the ABA Model
Rule, both in form and content; the New York Rule notes that "[a] lawyer shall not... knowingly
use perjured testimony or false evidence; [or] participate in the creation or preservation of
evidence when the lawyer knows or it is obvious that the evidence is false." N.Y. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a)(4)-(5) (2009). Rule 3.03(a)(5) of the Texas Rules of Professional
Conduct adds an additional element to ABA Model Rule 3.3(a) (imposing a proscription against
offering evidence that the lawyer knows to be false) by indicating that the lawyer also cannot use
such evidence. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 84(G), app. A, R. 3.03(a)(5) (Vernon 2005).
Conversely, Texas Rule 3.03(a)(1) adds the element of materiality to the rule against making false
statements to the tribunal. Id. at R. 3.03(a)(1). It thus appears that, in Texas, one may make false
statements in court as long as that false statement is not deemed to be material. Id. New
Mexico's interpretation of the ABA Model Rules is also unusual. Rule 16-102(D) of the New
Mexico Rules of Professional Conduct expands on the corresponding ABA Model Rule by
stating:
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the
lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent or misleads the tribunal. A lawyer may,
however, discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a
client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the
validity, scope, meaning or applicationof the law.
N.M. STAT. R. 16-102(D) (2009) (emphasis added to highlight language in the New Mexico rule
that does not appear in the ABA Model Rule). Rule 16-202(A) of the New Mexico Rules of
Professional Conduct, like Texas's Rule on this same point, also adds the materiality requirement
to the proscription against making false statements to a tribunal. Id. at R. 16-303(A)(1); TEX.
GOV'T CODE ANN. § 84(G), app. A, R. 3.03(a)(5). New Mexico Rule 16-303(A)(3) further
differs from the Model Rule concerning falsifying evidence, providing that a lawyer shall not
"offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false." N.M. STAT. R. 16-303(A)(3) (emphasis
added). In the New Mexico Rules, the word "knows" is internally defined as "actual knowledge
of the fact in question." Id. at R. 16-100(F). Further, New Mexico Rule 16-303(A)(3) provides
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depositions 31-and, as such, the Anti-False Testimony Principle guides and
constrains all lawyers practicing in the United States.
B. The Two Meanings of "FalseTestimony"
Lawyers and judges often use the expression "false testimony" in two
different circumstances. This double usage can generate confusion for readers.
Even though context often helps to clarify the meaning, only one of these
usages is encompassed by the Anti-False Testimony Principle. In the first
usage, "false" means the opposite of "true" and is used to assert only that a
statement is incorrect.
"False testimony," then, simply means that the
testimony is untrue or incorrect. Employing this meaning, Justice Kennedy,
dissenting in James v. Illinois, wrote that "[i]n some cases, of course, false
testimony can result from faulty recollection," thus equating falsity with (mere)
inaccuracy.32 Because there is nothing morally questionable about simply
being mistaken, this usage of "false" carries no moral opprobrium. It is not the
target of the ethical rules, and thus is not the focus of the Anti-False Testimony
Principle.
On the other hand, "false testimony" sometimes offers ethical or moral
criticism. It is this sense of "false" that the Anti-False Testimony Principle
encompasses. In this context, "false testimony" refers to testimony offered to
deceive the court and, hence, to pervert the objective of accurate fact-finding.
Witnesses, of course, may attempt deception on their own by offering
testimony that they-but not their lawyers-know to be inaccurate. Such
conduct may appropriately be punished by the criminal law. Grounded in the
rules governing the conduct of lawyers, however, the Anti-False Testimony
Principle applies when-and only when-the lawyer participates actively or
passively in the deception. There are two general circumstances in which such
a violation occurs: (1) the testimony is incorrect and the lawyer and possibly,
but not necessarily, the witness know(s) that it is incorrect; and (2) the lawyer
and possibly, but not necessarily, the witness advance(s) the testimony for
litigation advantage, willfully disregarding inquiry into its factual accuracy.

that "a lawyer may refuse to offer evidence ... that the lawyer reasonably believes is false," a
distinction that leaves unclear whether a lawyer may alternatively choose to offer such evidence,
given that the rule uses the permissive "may" rather than the mandatory "shall." Id.at R. 16303(A)(3).
31. See, e.g., Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct of Iowa Bar v. Crary, 245 N.W.2d 298,
304-05 (Iowa 1976) (applying Iowa's version of Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) in the context of a
deposition perjury charge to revoke the license of a lawyer who knew that his client was
testifying falsely in her deposition).
32. James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 326 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The James case is
further examined in Part V.B.2.b. See infra notes 165-70 and accompanying text.
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Both of these circumstances fall within the ambit of Model Rule331.2(d) and its
ban on a lawyer's participation in criminal or fraudulent activity.
Before it is possible to delve into the most problematic areas in which the
the Anti-False Testimony Principle applies, it is necessary to consider the
previously noted distinction between testimony recounting the historical
record-past perceptions and past mental states-and testimony describing
present understandings.
IV. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN FACTS IN THE HISTORICAL RECORD AND
FACTS CONCERNING UNDERSTANDINGS

The first step in examining a lawyer's ethical duties when preparing a fact
witness to testify is to distinguish the two general categories of facts about
which the witness is required to testify. The most common category of facts,
which is frequently treated as if it were the only category,34 is the category of
witness reports about what happened in the past. This category, in turn, has
two sub-categories: (1) reports of perceptions that the witness experienced
sometime in the past and (2) reports about his state of mind, also at sometime
in the past. Together, these facts constitute-so far as any particular case is
concerned-the historical record. Rarely discussed, however, is another
category of facts: facts about the present understandings of a witness that
explain or sometimes justify the witness's conduct or the witness's current
belief about his obligations. The reason why it is necessary to explain these
categories at the outset is simple: as this Article will show, a lawyer's ethical
duties under the Anti-False Testimony Principle vary markedly depending on
whether testimony is sought about the historical record or about present
understandings.
A. Factual Testimony: Accessing the HistoricalRecord
Testimony that accurately describes a portion of the historical record
requires, first, that there actually was an event in the past and, second, that the
witness is capable of offering a description of it. The first of these
requirements, which we call verifiable facts, is necessary to any historical
account. The second-the ability of the witness to testify-varies, depending
on whether the witness testifies about an event in the world external to his
mind, or whether he recounts his own past state of mind. Where he testifies
33. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2009) ("A lawyer shall not counsel
a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent....").
34. See generally Morrissette, supra note 12, at 105-06 ("The witness must be able to
articulate what happened, what they did or did not do, and why they did or did not do it."); Salmi,
supra note 2, at 139-43 (examining ethical considerations of preparing witnesses' recollection of
prior events); Wydick, supra note II (articulating a framework for the ethical coaching of
witnesses in testifying about past events).
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about perceptual facts, his testimony has two components: first, what he
perceived at the time of the perception and, second, what he remembers about
those perceptions at the time he testifies. Where a witness testifies about what
he thought at the relevant time in the past, his testimony is based on his
memory of what may be called his "mental event."
1. Verifiable Facts
Litigating questions of fact consists of attempting to prove what actually
occurred. In many civil cases, particularly tort cases, the facts that lawyers
develop purport to mirror or report events in the physical world.35 But
litigation also can concern the witness's state of mind at some point in the past.
When lawyers talk about "what happened," they can mean either "what
actually happened out there in the physical world," or "what someone thought
at a particular time," or both. The assumption behind such statements is that
there really is, or was, something out there in the world to which reference can
be made and about which factually correct statements can be made.
To lawyers, then, it is second-nature to accept that (however difficult they
may be to prove in particular cases) there really are facts "back there" or "out
there" in the past. So deeply held is this view that lawyers frequently have
trouble understanding how or why philosophers have struggled, at least since
the seventeenth century, if not since classical antiquity, to provide an account
that they, as philosophers, consider to be satisfactory proof of the "obvious"
proposition that there is a physical world that exists separate and apart from
one's perceptions of it. Further, lawyers, as well as other laypersons, find it
puzzling that philosophers worry about whether the facts constituting such a
world can be known. 3 6
Notwithstanding these concerns, the working
assumption in the legal system is that there are facts "out there" that, in
principle, can be known, and that assumption is not challenged here.
To say that facts "as they really are" can be known is to say that they are,
again in principle, verifiable. On this assumption, the goal of the fact-finder in
litigation is to determine what these "verifiable facts" are.37 The practical goal
of litigation, from the court's point of view, therefore, is to get as close as
35. See generally MALONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 21-25 (explaining that a central purpose
in taking depositions is gathering facts about what happened in events leading to the litigation).
36. See generally THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 929-31 (Robert Audi ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2d ed. 1999) (defining "truth" in the context of philosophy as "the quality
of those propositions that accord with reality, specifying what is in fact the case"). It is no
exaggeration to say that proving the existence of a world outside of our own minds-and
determining whether there is language that can actually correspond to such a world-has been
one of the principal tasks of Western philosophy, at least since the work of French philosopher
Rene Descartes (1596-1650). For those untrained in philosophy, see id. at 223-27, 273-78
(providing a brief description of the issues within entries for "Descartes" and "Epistemology").
37. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1990) (noting that a finding of
perjury was "sufficiently factual" to be verified by examining "objective evidence").
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possible to such facts as the frailties of human perception and memory permit.
The fundamental ethical goal of the Anti-False Testimony Principle supports
this quest. The basic thrust of the Anti-False Testimony Principle is to prohibit
lawyers from interfering with that quest by altering the record to include
factual statements that contradict-and are known to contradict-real or
verifiable facts merely because other alleged facts would strengthen their
cases.
2. PerceptualFacts: What Was Perceivedand What Is Remembered
When a witness testifies to a fact based on his perception, two requirements
are necessary for the testimony to be accurate. First, the witness must have
perceived the event or phenomenon he is describing; and, second, he must
accurately remember what he perceived. Persons have firsthand knowledge of
events that took place in the physical world when they claim knowledge of
those events based on the operation of one or more of their five senses. Most
commonly, these are reports of what witnesses saw or heard, though
sometimes witnesses also report results from their sense of touch (in the
testimony of a victim in a bum case), taste (in a food poisoning case), or smell
(in a pollution nuisance case). In law, firsthand witnesses are competent to
testify about these events because of-and only because of-their perceptions;
38
hence they are percipient (or perception) witnesses. Obviously, a perceptual
witness can be mistaken about his perception, a possibility that the lawyer
preparing a witness to testify, the lawyer taking his deposition, or the lawyer at
trial cross-examining the witness will explore. The purpose of such a
challenge is to show that the facts as the witness says he perceived them vary
from the true, verifiable facts.
Typically, perception witnesses testify about past perceptions, although
occasionally witnesses are asked to testify about a present sense impression,
such as identifying a particular person in the courtroom. Where witnesses
testify about past perceptions, however, their testimony about such
perceptions is one step removed. Except in the infrequent present sense
impression case, perception witnesses do not testify about their current
perceptions; rather, they testify about their memories of past perceptions. This
means that the testimony that witnesses give about past perceptions is not,
strictly speaking, testimony about the perceptions themselves. The traditional
expression "firsthand knowledge" is therefore something of a misnomer, for a
witness can only testify about what he remembers of his past perceptions. A
witness is permitted to testify because he had direct firsthand knowledge of
events in the past. His testimony, however, can only report his present
memory of that perception. Again, it will be fair game for an adverse party's
38. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1634 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "percipient witness" as "[a]
witness who has perceived the things about which he or she testifies").
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lawyer who examines the witness-whether in his deposition or on crossexamination at trial-to challenge the accuracy of that memory. As a result,
the duty of the lawyer preparing the witness to testify will include making him
aware that his memory will be the subject of examination. While the AntiFalse Testimony Principle may permit the preparing lawyer from trying to
shore up his witness's memory, it does 39not permit the lawyer to try to create a
memory that the witness does not have.
Accordingly, in an asbestos bodily-injury case, where the question is
whether the plaintiff (or the plaintiffs decedent) inhaled fibers manufactured
by a particular defendant, the plaintiff will need to tie the defendantmanufacturer to the plaintiff's injury. A witness likely can only accomplish
this feat by testifying that he worked in the plant where the injury was alleged
to have occurred and that he remembers seeing packages with the defendant
asbestos-maker's name on it. If the plaintiff fails to offer such testimony, the
defendant will prevail on its motion for summary judgment; this was the fact
pattern in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, the United States Supreme Court opinion
widely cited for summary judgment principles. 40 The same method of proof is
required whenever "what happened" is the issue. Unless a recording device
was present when the events at issue occurred, 41 persons who witnessed events
are only able to testify about what they perceived or, more precisely, what they
remember about those perceptions at the moment of their testimony. Just as
faulty perception can cause perception testimony to vary from verifiable facts,
so too can faulty memory. Just as lawyers violate the Anti-False Testimony
Principle by altering accounts of perceptions, so too do they violate it by
persuading a witness to remember what he actually does not remember.
3. Past States of Mind and Memories of Past States of Mind
If many verifiable facts take place in the external world, many also take
place in the mind. At particular times, people have particular states of mind.
We can call these mental events.42 We use the word "events" because that

39.

See infra notes 149-55 and accompanying text for a more complete discussion of what

exactly the Anti-False Testimony Principle requires in this regard.
40. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 319-20 (1986).
41. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81 (2007) (declining to adopt plaintiffs
statement of the facts when that rendition did not comport with the Justices' perceptions of a
video recording of the event in question); see also Leah A. Walker, Will Video Kill the Trial
Courts' Star? How "Hot" Records will Change the Appellate Process, 19 ALB. L.J. Sci. &

TECH. 449 (2009), availableat http://works.bepress.com/leahwalker/l/.
42. Laypersons and lawyers commonly cast this distinction as one between physical and
mental events. Drawing the distinction in this way leaves unanswered the question about what
goes on in the human brain. Whether mental states are simply chemical and physical phenomena
or whether they are something more is a question of interest to philosophers, neurobiologists, and
(perhaps) theologians. For purposes of what lawyers need to know, however, these questions can
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word implies that people have states of mind at identifiable times. Thus, for
example, suppose that in a deposition in a medical malpractice case, a doctordefendant is asked why he chose to follow one course of treatment, rather than
another, in caring for the plaintiff-patient. What the doctor actually thought
when he made his treatment choice is as much a part of "what really
happened" as what the people involved saw or heard.43 In such an example,
what the doctor actually thought in choosing a course of treatment is a
verifiable fact. Testimony about past mental events is similar in many respects
to testimony about past perceptions. First, such past states of mind, in
principle, constitute verifiable facts in the same way that past perceptions do.
Second, when testifying, the doctor can only testify about what he remembers
thinking at the relevant time. The operation of the Anti-False Testimony
Principle regarding a witness's memory of his past thoughts is identical to its
operation regarding his memory of his past perceptions.
Testimonial reports of past perceptions and of past mental states, therefore,
constitute testimony that reports relevant portions of the historical record.
Sometimes, in an imperfect world, testimony about the historical record will
not correspond to the verifiable facts. In the case of testimony about
perceptions, testimony can be honestly erroneous either because the witness's
perceptions were mistaken or because his memories are clouded. In the case of
testimony about past mental statements, testimony can be honestly erroneous
because of flawed memory. Thus, there is always the possibility that
testimony about the historical record will not correspond to the true, verifiable
facts. Notably, however, honest errors in perception or memory do not violate
the Anti-False Testimony Principle because no deception is involved. Before
examining various kinds of cases in which the Anti-False Testimony Principle
works to prevent deceptive alteration of the historical record, however, it is
important to distinguish a kind of testimony that fact witnesses routinely give
in depositions and which does not constitute a part of the historical record.
B. FactualTestimony: A Witness 's Present Understanding
According to a widely-accepted legal definition, "[f]acts include not just
tangible things, actual occurrences, and relationships, but also states of mind
such as intentions and opinions. ' ' 4 Testimony about some states of mind, as
shown, is broadly similar to testimony about perceptions: a witness is asked to
recount, at the time of his testimony, what he remembers thinking, just as he
be put aside. By using the expression "mental events," therefore, we make no claims about
whether or to what extent such mental states have a non-physical component.
43. Although mental events are frequently difficult to prove other than by the testimony of
the person whose mental state is at issue, this is not necessarily the only testimony that is
available; for example, another doctor or nurse in the operating room could testify about what the
defendant-doctor said at the time he made a choice in treatment.
44. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 628 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "fact").
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may be asked to describe what he remembers perceiving. Frequently,
however, a witness's contemporaneous state of mind is relevant in litigation
and constitutes a routine subject of deposition inquiry.
This is true both where parties voluntarily undertake obligations, as in
transactions, and where the law imposes involuntary duties, as in torts.
Suppose, first, that a dispute between Developer and Builder arises out of their
contract for the construction of a large commercial office park. Because of
certain circumstances that took place during construction, Builder claims that it
was entitled under the agreement to substitute a lower-cost product. In
deposition discovery addressing this issue, counsel would doubtless elicit
testimony recounting any conversations between the persons who negotiated
the contract, or between principals of the two companies, about this issueeven if, at trial, such testimony might be barred under the parol evidence rule.45
Although this testimony would clearly constitute memories of perceptionwhat the witness heard himself or someone else say-such testimony would be
relevant-at least for discovery purposes-to show the contemporaneous state
of mind of persons who negotiated the contract concerning the right to
substitution. Regardless of whether mental states that were not communicated
by witnesses at the time of contract formation would be deemed relevant and
admissible at trial,46 there is little doubt that inquiry in a discovery deposition
about a witness's state of mind is relevant as "reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence. 47
45.

11

CONTRACTS

SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
§ 33.1 (4th ed. 1999) (explaining that the parol evidence rule "prohibits the

admission of extrinsic evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral agreements or prior written
agreements, to explain the meaning of a contract when the parties have reduced their agreement
to an unambiguous integrated writing").
46. See Durbin v. National Loan Investors, L.P., No. C02-0302 BZ, 2002 WL 32799676, at
*4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2002) ("It is well-established that evidence of a 'subjective,
uncommunicated intent of one of the parties' to a contract cannot be used to contradict the terms
of the contract." (quoting Yount v. Acuff Rose-Opryland, 103 F.3d 830, 836 (9th Cir. 1996))),
rev'd on other grounds, 111 Fed. App'x 485 (9th Cir. 2004); DeSilva v. Commonwealth, No.
2796-08-02, 2009 WL 3425363, at *3 (Va. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2009) (noting that
"uncommunicated intent is not relevant to the issue of the accused's intent").
47. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Contract cases present a stark example of the principle
that testimony legitimately sought in depositions is often much broader than what is admissible at
trial. It is well-settled that the interpretation of a contract is a question of law for the court. See,
e.g., Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Torres, 561 F.3d 74, 77 (1st Cir. 2009); Bragg v. Bill Heard Chevrolet,
Inc., 374 F.3d 1060, 1065 (11th Cir. 2004); Seaboard Lumber Co. v. United States, 308 F.3d
1283, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Under the parol evidence rule, courts generally treat contracts that
are deemed unambiguous as instruments that must be interpreted on the plain meaning of the
language contained therein. WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 45, at § 33.1 (setting forth the parol
evidence rule). In the process of interpreting the contract, the court will likely refuse to admit
testimony as to what the persons who executed the contract thought it meant, unless the court is
persuaded that the contractual language is ambiguous. Notwithstanding the parol evidence rule,
lawyers generally elicit deposition testimony about what the people who negotiated the agreement
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Such inquiries, however, do not exhaust the range of testimony that
examining counsel would seek from officials of both the Builder and the
Developer.
These witnesses could also be asked about their present
understandings of the contractual obligations. As in administrative law, where
parties may sometimes rely on "post hoc" rationalizations of agency actions, 48
what parties think at the time of litigation may be relevant to determine the
legal significance of what happened in the past. Such testimony is an
important part of many depositions, especially in complex commercial cases. 49
As will be shown below, it is critical to distinguish this category of testimony,
because the Anti-False Testimony Principle applies less stringently to
testimony about a witness's present state of mind than it does to testimony
about the historical record.50
To illustrate why present understandings are an important part of deposition
practice, we first consider the hypothetical contract case just discussed,
followed by a hypothetical tort case in which testimony beyond the historical
record would likely be sought.
Suppose that, in the contract for the
construction of the large commercial office park just hypothesized, the
question presented-whether and, if so, in what circumstances, Builder may
substitute lower-cost products-turns on the reading of one clause in the
contract. Suppose further that the clause can plausibly be read in different
ways-by Builder to support an argument that, under certain circumstances, it
had the right to substitute product, and by Developer to preclude such
substitution. To make the case realistic, let us further assume that both Builder
and Developer are corporations, which means that the parties themselves will
have no understanding, except that which is attributed to them by their agents.
As the dispute ripens into one in which both parties understand that an
amicable settlement will not be reached, management of each of the companies
retains counsel. Finally, let us assume that, on the language itself, the case is a
close one, such that neither party, acting on the advice of counsel, is prepared
immediately to offer a settlement at a price the other is likely to accept.
thought about the terms to which they were agreeing. Testimony about what witnesses
understood in the past or-as this Article will address-at present is frequently placed before
courts even though it would not be admitted at trial. For example, in summary judgment briefs or
in briefs in support of motions in limine, counsel will often cite the testimony of what witnesses
thought in an effort to persuade the court to read the unambiguous language their way, or to open
the door to the admission of extrinsic evidence by declaring the contract ambiguous.
48. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971),
remanded, 335 F. Supp. 873 (W.D. Tenn. 1972), rev'd, 494 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1974). A court
may sometimes use post hoc affidavits to provide additional explanations of agency actions. See,
e.g., Alpharma, Inc. v. Leavitt, 460 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Am.'s Cmty. Bankers v. Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp., 200 F.3d 822, 835 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Sys. Plus, Inc. v. United States, 69 Fed.
Cl. 757, 765 n.5 (Fed. Cl. 2006); PGBA v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 196,204 (Fed. Cl. 2004).
49. See infra Part V.C.I.
50. See infra Part V.B-C.
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The lawyers for each side are aware that under the applicable substantive
law, contract language susceptible to two separate meanings is deemed
ambiguous 5 1 and that the law permits parties to a contract to introduce extrinsic
evidence to ascertain the meaning of ambiguous terms. 52 Such a scenario
raises at least four questions for the lawyers on each side. All four of these
questions relate to the ultimate question: what does the contract term mean?
The first question is the perception question-was anything communicated
about the meaning of the contractual terms at the time the agreement was
made? The second question is the contemporaneous mental state questiondid the officials of the lawyers' corporate client, or officials of the opposing
party corporation, have any contemporaneous understanding of the terms now
at issue when the deal was finalized? The third and fourth questions are
different. For each side, the questions are as follows: what position are we
going to take on the meaning of the contract term at issue? And, what position
is the other side going to take on the same issue? Answers to all four of these
questions help counsel determine what position to take on that question of law.
But-and this is the critical point for the issue presently under considerationanswers to the third and fourth questions-what one's own position should be
and what the position of its opponent is likely to be-are unconstrained by
what people said or thought in the past. These questions are not questions that
can be answered by appeal to the historical record.
In practice, the third and fourth questions are likely to be the most important
and also the most contentious. As lawyers who litigate complex contract
disputes know, it is quite probable that when the organization's principals
negotiated the construction contract at issue, there likely was no discussion of
the present issue-the right to substitute lower-cost products. Indeed, it is
quite possible that the principals, as distinguished from their lawyers, never
even considered the issue. The principle that agreements reflect a meeting of
the minds of the contracting parties-one that all lawyers learned in their firstyear Contracts classes-is more a legal presumption than a generally verifiable
statement of empirical psychology. When business people negotiate a deal,
they come to an agreement about key issues such as the price and the details of
performance, and then they turn the matter over to their lawyers to "reduce the
deal to writing." It is unlikely that the persons whose minds are presumed to
have met carefully considered the specific terms of performance-terms that
were later included in the contract by the transactional lawyers. This reality
means that in creating the legal positions that both Builder and Developer will
take, the parties' lawyers are unlikely to discover--either in interviewing their
own clients or in taking depositions of parties on the opposing side-any
51. See generally WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 45, at § 30:5 (explaining that a court will
find a contract to be ambiguous if the language is susceptible of more than one meaning).
52. Id. § 30:7 (noting that extrinsic evidence may be examined to resolve ambiguous
language).
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memories of past conversations between representatives of both parties (or
even between persons in the same company) or any memories of what the
principals thought at that time.
Thus, in addition to their inquiries about the historical record, lawyers on
both sides will ask-and prepare their own witnesses to respond when askedabout the witness's (or, if it is the deposition of a corporate representative, the
representative's 53) understanding of the meaning of the contract term in dispute
or, more generally, about whether the Builder was entitled to substitute
products during construction. Asking such questions constitutes a timehonored method for determining what position the other side will take on a
disputed issue, and preparing one's witness to answer them is a key step in a
lawyer's development of the position her client will take.54 Answers to such
questions may also help inquiring counsel determine the level of conviction
with which the other side holds its position-knowledge that can be critical in
settlement negotiations. Any lawyer preparing to defend the deposition of a
corporate official in the Builder-Developer litigation will need to prepare her
witnesses for such questions. Such questions elicit testimony about present
understandings, not about the historical record.
Tort cases nearly always contain disputes about past events. In some tort
cases, however, questions also arise about present understandings, which
constitute or refute post hoc rationalizations justifying or excusing the conduct
that allegedly injured the plaintiff. Suppose that an airliner crashed during
take-off in a snowstorm, killing everybody on board. In litigation brought by
the personal representatives of the decedents, one of the plaintiffs' lawyers'
theories is that the design of the engines was defective, so that for certain
technical reasons, it made the engines likely to have destabilized the airplane
during adverse weather conditions. A second theory is that the airline was
negligent in its maintenance of the aircraft, the way in which the pilots were
trained, and the way in which the pilots handled the plane at the time of the
crash. Assume that among the defendants are the manufacturer of the aircraft
and the manufacturer of the engines. In litigation of this sort, in addition to
expert testimony, deposition witnesses would be asked to testify about the

53. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) (specifying the rule for deposing a corporate
representative).
54. See generally Kent Sinclair & Roger P. Fendrich, Discovering CorporateKnowledge &
Contentions: Rethinking Rule 30(b)(6) & Alternative Mechanisms, 50 ALA. L. REV. 651, 687
(1999) (discussing a lawyer's duty to prepare a Rule 30(b)(6) witness). Questions of the
witness's own understanding of a particular occurrence are routinely asked of both individual fact
witnesses noticed for deposition in federal procedure under Rule 30(b)(1) and of Rule 30(b)(6)
witnesses. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(l), (6). For an extensive discussion of Rule 30(b)(6) deposition
practice criticizing, among other things, the use of Rule 30(b)(6) depositions in place of
contention interrogatories, see Sinclair & Fendrich, supra,at 707-09.
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historical record; for example, memories of past events such their recollection
of the design decisions.
Plaintiffs, however, would also depose the manufacturer's engineers and
executives about their present understanding of the issues concerning engine
design. Indeed, if the defense put forth by the manufacturers is likely to have
much of a chance of succeeding, formulation of a persuasive position on why
the design, in hindsight, was sound would be essential.
Since these
understandings could prove to be a critical part of the defense on this aspect of
the claim, competent preparation of these witnesses for their depositions would
require preparation on how to answer these "present understandings"
questions. Again, as in the contract dispute previously discussed, it is clear
that such testimony is not about perceptions.
Rather, it is about
understandings.
V. THE APPLICATION OF THE ANTI-FALSE TESTIMONY PRINCIPLE TO
PERCEPTUAL FACTS AND FACTS CONCERNING PRESENT UNDERSTANDINGS

The fundamental distinction about the working of the Anti-False Testimony
Principle concerns whether a lawyer is preparing her witness to testify about
the historical record or about his present understanding. Testimony about the
historical record is supposed to describe what really happened in the past,
whether in the physical world or in the mind of a person. Testimony about
present understandings, in contrast, does not recount facts that exist in the
historical or external world. It is the interpretationof the present significance
of phenomena that prompts an inquiry from counsel such as, "what do you
think (understand) Paragraph 17(a) of the contract required your company to
do?"
At the most basic level, therefore, the operation of the Anti-False Testimony
Principle regarding testimony about the historical record is easy to observe.
Where a witness testifies about his memories of the relevant historical record,
the Anti-False Testimony Principle, drawn from Model Rules 3.3(a)(3) and
3.4(b),55 precludes a lawyer from altering the witness's account of the
historical record, or offering testimony that the lawyer knows inaccurately
reports that record. Put differently, the Principle constrains a lawyer's conduct
in two distinct, but morally identical, situations: (1) where the lawyer has a
motive 56 to induce her client to tell a more favorable story than the verifiable
facts in the historical record warrant and (2) where the lawyer believes that the
witness himself is tailoring his testimonial story to achieve that end. More
particularly, a lawyer cannot induce or permit a witness to testify that he (the
witness) perceived something different than what he is confident that he did

55.
56.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3, 3.4 (2009).
See infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
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perceive; 57 nor can a lawyer induce or permit a witness to say he remembers or
does not remember something when such a statement is false. 58 Where the
witness is testifying about his present understanding, however, there is no preexisting baseline of historical fact that constrains the lawyer. While, as we
shall see, the Anti-False Testimony Principle precludes a lawyer from assisting
a witness to offer as his understanding what he does not believe, 59 the main
potency of the Principle lies where testimony concerns the historical record.
In this Part, we first consider the circumstances that have led to ethical
concems about the activities of lawyers preparing witnesses to testify about
their perceptions. We then discuss certain solutions to issues that leading
commentators have proposed regarding preparing witnesses to testify about the
historical record. This discussion will consider the ramifications of the AntiFalse Testimony Principle on a range of issues that commentators have
discussed and that lawyers regularly encounter. Having considered the AntiFalse Testimony Principle in these historical contexts, we will then show why
the Principle has only limited applicability to a lawyer's preparation of her
witnesses to testify about their present understandings. This discussion will
show that if litigators are to be able to perform the functions for which their
clients hired them-to construct and successfully litigate cases-they must be
subject to much less stringent ethical limitations when assisting witnesses to
testify about present understandings than when preparing them to testify about
perceptions.
A. The Duty to Represent the Client Vigorously and Curbingthe Objective
Motivation to Strengthen the Record
A lawyer's categorical duty not to attempt to place evidence that is
60
inaccurate and known to be inaccurate in the record is not subject to debate.
Like the statesman's pre-eminent duty to avoid nuclear war, 6 1 this duty, though
yielding to none in significance, presents few questions of fundamental policy.
Simply stated, for the lawyer committed to integrity and the highest
professional standards, Model Rules 3.3 and 3.4 require that she must accept
the historical facts of a case as they are. From a purely ethical point of view,
57. See, e.g., Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 168-71 (1986) (ruling that a lawyer's duty to
refrain from proffering false evidence extends even when her client chooses to give false
testimony on his own volition).
58.

See id.

59. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
60. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (stating that a lawyer shall not
"offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false").
61. See BRIAN BARRY, POLITICAL ARGUMENT Ixxiv (Univ. of Cal. Press 1990) (explaining
that a statesman's duty to avoid "an all-out nuclear war is so plain as to be philosophically
uninteresting").
62.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3, 3.4 (2009).
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therefore, a lawyer is always safe in allowing her witnesses to tell their stories
as they remember them, in the words that initially come to their minds. Where
they apply, the ethical rules trump the desire to win a case; but a mere
scrupulous compliance with the ethical rules is not the only goal of a lawyer.
More is at stake. The important question-the question that lawyers preparing
their clients constantly face-is "What can I do to make this testimony better
without violating the ethical rules?"
Clients hire lawyers to achieve results, and lawyers, as generally competitive
people, want to win, separate and apart from whether they have a financial
stake in the outcome. If a case gets very far into litigation, both sides' cases
are likely to contain a number of "good" (favorable) and a number of "bad"
(unfavorable) facts, because if all facts tilt in one direction and the lawyers are
rational and can persuade their clients to be the same, the case will settle before
extensive pre-trial activities occur. On the other hand, the goal to improve
settlement posture (or to prevail at trial if necessary) creates an incentive for
lawyers to push the envelope in preparing their witnesses to testify. The
incentive to "improve" the record, therefore, is objective-that is, it does not
depend on the character of a lawyer or how highly she values the ethical rules.
The "better" the testimony in the record (and the less the amount of
unfavorable testimony), the better the lawyer's chances of prevailing in a case.
This objective motivation cannot be gainsaid, but the Anti-False Testimony
Principle shows that it is neither the only nor even the most important factor in
play. Without suggesting that the Anti-False Testimony Principle (or any other
ethical principle) can ever be legitimately violated, one of a lawyer's basic
63
duties in representing her client is to try to achieve the best possible result.
The rules do not require that lawyers adopt the completely passive posture of
a potted plant when hearing how their clients or witnesses describe events that
they perceived.
This principle is supported by at least one leading
commentator who has dealt with the problem of the objective motivation for a
lawyer to improve her case. 64 Indeed, we agree with Professor Hodes that

63.

See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICs 578 (1986) ("[T]he American

lawyer's professional model is that of zeal: a lawyer is expected to devote energy, intelligence,
skill, and personal commitment to the single goal of furthering the client's interests as those are
ultimately defined by the client."); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. I

("A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or
personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical measures are
requiredto vindicate a client 's cause or endeavor." (emphasis added)). Likewise, the annotation
to Rule 1.2(a) of the Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct notes that "[i]f the lawyer
fails to carry out these objectives, through, for example, a lack of diligence or competence, this
will, a fortiori, constitute a violation of Rule 1.2." ANN. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.2(a) (6th ed. 2007).
64. See generally Hodes, supra note 11 (addressing a lawyer's duty to represent her client
zealously).
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exclusive preoccupation with not running afoul of ethical rules can
compromise the vigorous representation to which the client is entitled.
At law school orientation one year, . . . a retired judge told
entering students that legal ethics is easy. "You simply find the line
between what is permitted and what is not," he said, "and stay far, far
to the good side of that line." I completely disagree, as I told my
first year Professional Responsibility students in our first hour alone
together.
Legal ethics is hard. You must try to find the line between what
is permitted and what is not, and then get as close to that line as you
can without crossing over to the bad side. Anything less is less than
zealous representation-which already leaves you on the bad side of
the line.65
Compliance with the ethical standards of the profession, therefore, does not
simply mean walking nowhere near the line where misconduct begins. 66 The
ethical rules-and not just those under discussion here as the Anti-False
Testimony Principle-function like a trump card. Where the rules are
implicated, their strictures apply. Clients need to understand this fact, but, as
67
Professor Hodes explains, professional duty requires zealous representation.
The Anti-False Testimony Principle operates to check the objective motivation
to strengthen the content of the record. The Anti-False Testimony Principle, in
short, is a brake upon the duty of zealous representation. In what follows, we
analyze the types of situations in which the duty to represent the client
vigorously must yield to the Anti-False Testimony principle.

65. Id. at 1366 (footnote omitted). Further in his article, Professor Hodes discusses what we
have called the Anti-False Testimony principle, explaining:
[t]he trick, of course, is judging how far to proceed along the spectrum that I have
already conceded runs from refreshing recollection all the way to prompting perjury.
Journey not far enough, and a lawyer deserves sanction for failing to carry out the most
basic duties encompassed by the client-lawyer relationship. Go too far, and a lawyer
has strayed into sanctionable and perhaps criminal territory.
Id at 1350 (footnotes omitted).
66. Notwithstanding the title of her article, "Don't Walk the Line," Ms. Salmi does not
suggest that lawyers are entirely precluded from any conduct that may enhance a witness's
testimony, such as discussing the applicable law, refreshing a witness's recollection of the facts
about which he will be called upon to testify, and even suggesting modifications of the word
choice witnesses initially used to describe their perceptions and demeanor. See Salmi, supra note
2, at 154-65. For a discussion of the difficult question regarding a lawyer's request that a witness
change his words, see infra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
67. Hodes, supranote 11, at 1366.
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1. Curbingthe Objective Motivation to Alter the Account ofEvents: The
Basic Thrust of the Anti-False Testimony Principle
The easiest application of the Anti-False Testimony Principle occurs in
situations in which accounts of historical events are concerned. As suggested
immediately above, where events are concerned, lawyers have an objective
motivation to make the testimony about such events as favorable as possible.
Moreover, clients have the same motivation, although sometimes it takes a
lawyer's description of the case for clients to understand where their objective
interest lies. The Anti-False Testimony Principle's clearest thrust is to bar
dishonest or deceptive testimony about the historical record.
On reading most of the existing literature on witness preparation, one could
be excused for thinking that witnesses only testify to recount their memories of
what they personally have perceived, and that consequently, the Anti-False
Testimony Principle operates exclusively to prohibit lawyers from tampering
with remembered accounts of those perceptions. 68 This narrow focus is a
mistake. In the previous Part, we have shown that testimony is not limited to
accounts of what happened, physically or mentally, at some time in the past.
Although it is arguably a chicken and egg problem, one reason for this narrow
focus has doubtless been that commentators have almost entirely devoted their
attention to tort and criminal cases, rather than disputes arising out of
transactions. The importance of tort cases is not questioned here; instead, we
question the unarticulated assumption in much of the literature that the typical
witness preparation problem in a civil case arises in such cases.
Tort cases are, by and large, about events. It is no exaggeration to say that
the settlements of many (if not most) tort cases turn on what counsel on both
sides of the dispute believe a jury would find based on testimony "locked in"
during depositions of key witnesses. As we will show, however, a critical part
of a tort case can involve testimony about a present understanding. 69 For the
present, it is sufficient to notice that testimony about historical events can
figure prominently in transactional litigation. In deference to the traditional
way of discussing this problem, we start with a tort scenario.
In the mid- to late-1990s, an incident that prompted important scholarly
commentary on witness preparation arose out of the conduct of the Dallas law
firm of Baron & Budd. Fitting neatly into the pattern of focusing on events,
the incident showed the temptations lawyers face in procuring more favorable
testimony about such events. Baron & Budd represented numerous workers
allegedly injured by asbestos products. °
The incident arose from the
inadvertent disclosure of a twenty-page document prepared by that firm,
68. See sources cited supranotes 62-63.
69. See infra Part V.C.1 (demonstrating the importance of the testimony of a present
understanding by working through a medical malpractice hypothetical).
70. See Hodes, supra note 11, at 1344, 1352.
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entitled Preparingfor Your Deposition.7 1 Like Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
asbestos bodily injury cases frequently turn on whether the plaintiff can prove
that he or she inhaled asbestos manufactured by a particular defendant. 72 If the
plaintiff or his witnesses cannot show that a particular defendant manufactured
the harm-causing product, as the Celotex Court held, that defendant can secure
summary judgment and escape trial. The risk that the claimant's lawyer can
73
prompt a recollection that is not genuinely that of the witness is thus severe.
A witness, even when he is the plaintiff, may not independently understand
the legal necessity of tying a particular manufacturer's product to the plaintiff's
injury. During the time that a person now stricken with asbestosis worked in a
factory, it was likely unimportant to notice whether there were asbestos cartons
identifying a particular manufacturer lying around the factory floor. Indeed, it
may well be a matter of chance if the plaintiff or a fellow worker happens to
remember this detail at all. To the plaintiffs lawyer, however, offering such
testimony may be a matter of victory-a lucrative settlement or a favorable
jury verdict--or defeat. The motive for a claimant's lawyer to persuade a
witness to say that he saw what he did not see, or to say that he remembers
seeing what he cannot now be sure he saw, is thus substantial.74 When his
lawyers explain this legal position to him, the plaintiff-witness himself will
objectively share the same motivation. Curbing this motivation to alter the
factual record is thus a central purpose for which the ethical rules prohibiting
false testimony are designed.75 Without such rules, there would be no check
on the objective motivations to improve testimony, and thus improve the
76
strength of a lawyer's case.
Tort cases do not uniquely contain objective motivations to alter the record
of past perceptions. Take, for example, a simple contract case. Suppose that a
contract provides that Vendor will supply Purchaser with a shipment of blue
71. For a full discussion of this incident by a lawyer serving as an expert witness in the case,
see id. at 1344-51.
72. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 319-20 (1986).
73. See Salmi, supra note 2, at 159.
74. See id
75. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 2 (2009).
76. See generally Salmi, supra note 2, at 143, 145-46, 159 (offering instances where a
lawyer may have motives to improve the testimony of a witness). As a further example, the
Baron & Budd memorandum shows lawyers crossing the line in a number of places in furtherance
of the goal of improved testimony; the law firm's improper purpose is clearly illustrated by the
instruction to prospective witnesses contained in the improper memorandum-Preparingfor
Your Deposition-that documents such as the memorandum itself that "you are reading right
now, are 'privileged' and should never be mentioned." Id. at 143 n.35 (quoting Bob Van Voris,
Client Memo EmbarrassesDallas Firm: Baron & Budd Coaching of Witnesses Called Improper,
NAT'L L. J., Oct. 13, 1997, at A30). The fact that such a document existed would not be
privileged (even if the contents were). The law firm's false claim of privilege in circumstances in
which none existed strongly suggests the impropriety of-and the firm's awareness of the
impropriety of-this preparation and coaching device.
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widgets on or before a certain date. If Purchaser claims that Vendor breached
either by shipping widgets that are not blue or by shipping the widgets after the
specified date, or both, Purchaser may prove its case for breach of contract
through the testimony of a receiving clerk who can testify about the color of
the widgets when he looked at them, or about the date on which the shipment
arrived. Assuming that the shipping clerk shares the motivation of his
corporate employer (perhaps believing it is in his employment interest to do
so), his motivation will be the same as that of the asbestosis plaintiff regarding
the memory of his perception. He will have an objective reason to say he
remembers seeing the blue widgets when they arrived, whether that is
genuinely his memory or not, and it will be consistent with his objective
interest to say he remembers the date on which the widgets arrived, perhaps
claiming that his recollection was refreshed by a document, regardless of
whether it was or was not. (The penalties of perjury, of course, present a
contrary objective interest to the witness.) Similarly, when a witness's past
mental state is at issue, a witness has motivation to say that his mental state is
the one that is most favorable to his case. The company's lawyer, just like the
plaintiffs lawyer in the asbestosis case, shares the same motivation.
Party witnesses and lawyers thus have a motivation to provide favorable
accounts of events to the extent they understand the relationship between those
accounts and the applicable law (or, in the case of witnesses, have had this
relationship explained to them by their lawyer). As indicated, we call this an
objective motivation because it does not arise from a subjective mental state of
either the witness or the lawyer to deceive the court, even though lawyers and
witnesses doubtlessly have such subjective motivations. Assuming that, all
other things being equal, the lawyer or client (or both) is acting rationally, he
or she will seek to present the most favorable factual account possible. Of
course, all other things are not equal: the rules of ethics, and more particularly
the Anti-False Testimony Principle, function to trump the objective motivation
to manufacture the most favorable factual account possible.
2. Types of Morally Objectionable "FalseTestimony"
As previously discussed, lawyers, judges, and commentators sometimes use
the expression "false testimony" to describe testimony that is merely
inaccurate. We have argued that the Anti-False Testimony Principle relates
only to testimony that is inaccurate and that carries some moral opprobrium,
because the lawyer
has participated, in one way or another, in an effort to
77
deceive the court.
Morally improper testimony comes in a number of guises. In the first
category, the witness decides, without the contrivance of his lawyer, to give
testimony that he knows is false, and he does so in order to deceive the court.
77.

See supra text accompanying notes 26-32.
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A witness can falsify and attempt to deceive either by what he says about his
perception or his memory. Thus, a witness can testify falsely in this sense
either because the witness knows he did not perceive what he now testifies he
did perceive or because he says he (clearly) remembers perceiving something
that, in reality, he does not remember. Further, "not remembering" in this
context encompasses the following: (1) that the witness does not remember at
all; (2) that he does not remember with the certainty with which he says he
remembers; or (3) that he remembers something contrary to what he now says
he remembers. All of these cases are examples of false testimony that is both
inaccurate and deceptive, for in each case, the witness is lying. If the lawyer
knows that the testimony is false, even on the assumption here that she did not
procure the false testimony, the lawyer violates Rule 3.3(a)(3) if she does not
"take reasonable remedial measures," because that rule prohibits a lawyer from
introducing evidence that the lawyer knows is false. 78 Even if the lawyer never
learns that the testimony is false and a product of the witness's deception, the
improper because it is a lie and may,
testimony is still morally
.....
79 if the facts come
In such a case,
to light, subject the witness to prosecution for perjury.
however, the moral opprobrium falls exclusively on the witness. Because the
lawyer was unaware of the inaccuracy or the deception, this case does not fall
within the Anti-False Testimony Principle.
A second category of morally improper testimony occurs when a lawyer
procures the inaccurate testimony with the intent of deceiving the court. The
plain language of Model Rule 3.4(b) prohibits a lawyer from "counsel[ing] or
assist[ing] a witness to testify falsely. ' 8 ° Here, there are two sub-categories.
In the first, the lawyer may induce the witness to recount the more favorable
story, and the witness himself may be aware of the deception. Lawyer and
witness, in such a case, are effectively co-conspirators. On the other hand, in
some cases, unlike Nix v. Whiteside, the witness believes his testimony is
truthful, but the lawyer knows that the testimony is inaccurate because, by
subtle manipulation, the lawyer has induced her witness to adopt the inaccurate

78. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2009); see also Nix v. Whiteside, 475
U.S. 157, 168 (1986) (ruling that counsel is required to disclose false testimony given by a client).
For an instance in which the lawyer knows that the testimony is inaccurate but the witness
genuinely believes it is accurate, see infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (2006) ("Whoever under oath . . .in any proceeding
before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United States knowingly makes any false
material declaration or makes or uses any other information, including any book, paper,
document, record, recording, or other material, knowing the same to contain any false material
declaration, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.").
80. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(b).
81. Nix, 475 U.S. at 160-61 (demonstrating a situation in which a witness wanted to give
false testimony but the lawyer refused to assist him in doing so).
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memory. 82 For example, in a typical asbestosis personal injury case, where the
plaintiff must show that the victim inhaled asbestos fibers manufactured by a
particular defendant in order for that defendant to be liable, 83 a lawyer may
decide to use suggestive techniques to persuade her witness to believe that he
remembers seeing the names of certain manufacturers on product labels. If the
lawyer succeeds in her manipulation, the witness is not lying, because he now
believes that what he is testifying is correct, even though it is not. This case is
thus the opposite of the case discussed above, 84 where the witness-but not the
lawyer-knows the testimony is inaccurate. In that case, the witness may be
guilty of perjury and the lawyer has done nothing wrong; in this case, however,
the witness has done nothing wrong, but the lawyer has
85 violated the Anti-False
Testimony Principle-specifically Model Rule 3.4(b).
It is clear that lawyers are implicated in wrongdoing when false testimony is
on the record, and they know that the testimony is inaccurate, yet they permit
This
or encourage its introduction because it strengthens their case.
knowledge requirement extends to both actual knowledge and constructive
knowledge; a lawyer cannot escape her ethical obligations when she induces
her witness to alter his testimony in a way that enhances the case, but then
argues that her conduct is acceptable because she does not know that the more
favorable testimony is false. 87 It is only logical to interpret the Anti-False
Testimony Principle to apply under the familiar principle that a lawyer is
responsible for what she knows or reasonably should know. 88 A lawyer thus
has a duty of reasonable investigation to make sure that the testimony she
permits her witness to 89give-or that which she assists her witness in
formulating-is accurate.

82. See infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of the circumstance
where the witness believes he is testifying accurately-and lawyer knows that the witness's
testimony is inaccurate-butthe testimony is not the result of the lawyer's intentional elicitation
of inaccurate testimony; rather, it is the product of the lawyer sending an implicit message of how
the story should be portrayed.
83. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 319-20 (1986); see also supra notes 44-45
and accompanying text.
84. See supra text accompanying note 79.
85. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from
"counsel[ing] or assist[ing] a witness to testify falsely").
86. See id
87. See generally D.C. Bar Op. No. 79 (1979), reprintedin DIST. OF COLUMBIA BAR, CODE
OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY & OPINIONS OF THE DIST. OF COLUMBIA BAR LEGAL ETHICS COMM.

138 (1991) (articulating the limits on a lawyer's participation in deposition preparation to include
presenting all evidence "unless [the lawyer] knows, or from facts within his knowledge should
know, that such testimony or evidence is false, fraudulent, or perjured" (emphasis added)).
88. See id.
89.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 8.
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From these general principles, it is necessary now to consider how the AntiFalse Testimony Principle applies to the preparation of deposition witnesses in
specific areas where problems can arise. We begin with testimony about the
historical record.
B. Ethical Duties ofLawyers in PreparingWitnesses to Testify About the
HistoricalRecord
1. The Easy Case: A Lawyer May Not PresentFalse Testimony
The most basic ethical command governing witness preparation bars the
informed presentation of inaccurate testimony. 9° As previously explained, this
standard operates in two different circumstances. First, even if a lawyer did
not procure the false testimony, she may not offer testimony to the tribunal that
she knows to be false. 91 Second, a lawyer may not attempt to procure or
induce false testimony. 92 This bar operates whether or not the witness knows
his testimony is false. What violates the Anti-False Testimony Principle is the
lawyer's knowledge that the testimony is inaccurate. So far as the Anti-False
Testimony Principle is concerned, these are easy cases.
a. Permittingthe Introduction of False Testimony
The easiest case concerns the unequivocal prohibition on the introduction of
testimony that both the lawyer and the witness know is false in that it is
inaccurate and introduced with the intent to deceive. Another easy case arises
when the lawyer offers testimony that she knows is inaccurate, even if the
lawyer played no part in fabricating the inaccurate testimony. Model Rule
3.3(a)(3) squarely prohibits such conduct. 93 This issue was addressed in the
landmark United States Supreme Court decision, Nix v. Whiteside.94
In Nix, the defendant in a murder case wanted to argue self-defense.95
Shortly before trial, the defendant contradicted the story he had told his lawyer
earlier, saying that he saw something metallic in the victim's hands, and that he
planned to so testify.96 His lawyer doubted the veracity of this newly minted
story and instructed his client that he could not testify with the altered version

90. See id. at R. 3.3(a)(3).
91. See id
92. See id. at R. 3.4(b). For a discussion of the issues pertaining to different types of lawyer
conduct that procure inaccurate testimony, see infra Part V.B. 1-2.
93. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3). Although Nix preceded the
current version of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, there is little doubt that Nix reflects
the Rule 3.3(a)(3) standard barring the introduction of false testimony. Nix v. Whiteside, 475
U.S. 157, 168 (1986).
94. 475 U.S. at 159.
95. Id. at 160.
96. Id. at 160-61.
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of the facts. 97 The Supreme Court ruled that the defendant did not have a
constitutional right to present the story that his lawyer thought was false and
that the lawyer complied with
his ethical duty by refusing to allow testimony
98
that he felt certain was false.
In practice, it is difficult to determine whether a person "knows" that
testimony is false. The Model Rules define "knowingly," "known," and
"knows" as "denot[ing] actual knowledge of the fact in question." 99 In the
next sentence, the definition continues, stating that "a person's knowledge may
be inferred from circumstances," ' 0 0 effectively softening the meaning of
"actual knowledge" to something analogous to reasonable belief. Absent the
admission of a witness' ° 1 or the lawyer's own knowledge based on what she
perceived, applying this definition affords wide latitude. Assuming knowledge
of inaccurate testimony, however, determining the lawyer's ethical duty is
easy. Introducing inaccurate
testimony known to be inaccurate, and thus
02
deceptive, is forbidden.
97.

Id. at 161.

98. Id. at 173, 175-76. Justice Stevens underscored the duty of counsel to prevent perjured
testimony in his concurring opinion. See id. at 190 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[I]t appears
perfectly clear that respondent intended to commit perjury, that his lawyer knew it, and that the
lawyer had a duty ... to take extreme measures to prevent the perjury from occurring."). No one
doubts that this prohibition applies in both civil and criminal cases. In Committee on
ProfessionalEthics & Conduct of Iowa State Bar Ass 'n v. Crary,the Iowa Supreme Court applied

the prohibition on offering false testimony to a lawyer who was sitting second-chair during the
defense of a deposition. 245 N.W.2d 298, 299, 307 (Iowa 1976). The facts were sordid: the false
testimony concerned the affair the witness was having with the lawyer. Id. at 299. Although the
court seemed to believe that the lawyer had helped the witness formulate the false testimony, it
did not rely on that belief. Id. at 305. The lawyer was disbarred for a different reason: he
permittedhis client to testify falsely. Id. at 307.
99.
100.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(f) (2009).
See id.

101.

See infra text accompanying notes 179-81.

102. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3). Unless one is talking about a fact
that is true by definition, like a mathematical formula, or a matter where one herself is a

percipient witness, the line between "belief' and "knowledge" cannot be definitely drawn. See,
e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Getting Honest About Client Perjury, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 133,
142 (2008). As Professor Freedman points out,
the words "know" and "knowledge" have been defined in the Terminology section of
the Model Rules in the most restrictive terms. Thus, "knowing" means "actual
knowledge," and the ABA, the American Law Institute, and the courts have all made it
clear that a lawyer will rarely "know" about client perjury.
For example, in the words of ABA Formal Opinion 87-353, it will be "the unusual
case" where the lawyer "does know" that a client intends to commit perjury. That
opinion states that knowing can be established only by the client's "clearly stated
intention" to perjure himself at trial.
Id. Yet, as quoted above, the definition of "knowing" in the Model Rules themselves establishes

that "knowledge may be inferred from circumstances." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.0(f). There is no easy touchstone or bright line rule that describes "knowing for sure" and
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b. Coaching Witnesses to Testify Falsely

In his extensive discussion of witness coaching, Professor Richard Wydick
distinguishes three types of coaching, which he labels Grade One, Grade Two,
and Grade Three Witness Coaching.10 3 Grades One and Two, as he describes
them, constitute easy cases, and Grade Three constitutes a much easier case
than Wydick seems to think. 10 4 Grade One witness coaching consists of
"knowingly and overtly induc[ing] a witness to testify to something the lawyer
knows is false." 105 Overt inducement occurs when a lawyer explicitly invites
the witness to offer testimony that will enhance the lawyer's case. 06 Thus, in
a case in which it is important to establish the distance between plaintiff (P)
and defendant (D) at the time in question, the lawyer representing P says
during the preparation of a cooperative, third-party eyewitness: "Let me be
frank. In this lawsuit it would be very helpful to P if the distance
1 0 7 between P
that?"
on
out
us
help
you
Could
yards.
100
than
less
were
D
and
Grade Two witness coaching consists of covert inducement.' 0 8 By this,
Professor Wydick means the circumstance in which "the lawyer's inducement
is masked. It is transmitted by implication. To use the common image, the
lawyer sends the witness a message 'between the lines' about how to tell the
story." 10 9 Grade Two coaching is also an ethical violation'1 10because "the
'known false testimony' element is the same as for Grade One."
Grade Three witness coaching, according to Wydick, occurs when "the
lawyer does not knowingly induce the witness to testify to something the
"being quite certain but .. " Some lawyers will be confident in saying that they know testimony
is false; others may prefer to say that deciding such a question is for the trier of fact.
103. See generally Wydick, supra note 11 (explaining Grade One, Grade Two, and Grade
Three witness coaching).
104. See id. at 37.
105. Id. at 18 (emphasis added). For a discussion of what Ms. Salmi terms "conduct that is
clearly unethical," see Salmi, supra note 2, at 148. Ms. Salmi includes cases where an attorney
"encourage[s] the witness to make untrue statements" and "instruct[s] the witness to claim a lack
of memory or knowledge as to any question that the witness does not want to answer." Id. at 148,
150. Presumably, this includes questions that the lawyer does not want the witness to answer.
Ms. Salmi's third category is where an attorney implies to her witness that false testimony can be
acceptable. Id. at 151. The example she gives draws on an article by Joseph D. Piorkowski,
which posits the situation in which a lawyer tells her client that the false testimony will secure the
ultimate goal of ensuring a just result-a favorable outcome to the litigation for the deserving
party. Id. (citing Piorkowski, supra note 11, at 402-03). As a fourth category, Ms. Salmi
describes a situation that appears ethically closely-related to the second category, namely, where
the lawyer "encourages the witness to evade answering a question or to provide evasive answers
to questions." Id. at 151-52.
106. See Wydick, supra note 11, at 19-20.
107. Id. at 20.
108. Id. at25.

109. Id.
110. Id.
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lawyer knows is false, but the lawyer's conversation with the witness
nevertheless alters the witness's story. ' 1 1 Wydick believes-mistakenly,
as
11 2
we argue-that such conduct does not violate the ethical rules.
Though his analysis has gone unchallenged for a number of years, much of
Professor Wydick's account is problematic. Grade Two witness coaching,
under his theory, omits an important "easy" case of covert witness coaching,
and Grade Three mistakenly suggests that a lawyer does not violate the ethical
rules in a circumstance in which she does.11 3 Wydick's description of Grade
One coaching is the only part that is accurate as it stands; it is an important
statement of the easiest case of witness coaching, and a lawyer's duties under
Model Rule 3.4(b). 1 14 Grade One dictates that a lawyer may not overtly
request that a witness testify falsely for any reason.115 The objective motivation
for the inaccurate testimony to strengthen the lawyer's case is trumped by the
Anti-False Testimony Principle. Few practitioners doubt that some lawyers
ignore the Model Rules and engage in such conduct because they think they
can get away with it-a scheme that prompts the memory of Justice Holmes'
"bad man" view of the law.116 It is difficult, however, to suppose that any
lawyer, even one who is prepared to violate
the rule, could doubt that a request
1 17
for false testimony is highly improper.

111.

Id.at37.

112. See id.at 37 n.112 ("By definition, Grade Three witness coaching does not involve
knowing inducement of testimony the lawyer knows is false. It therefore does not violate MODEL
RULES Rule 3.3(a)(4) or 3.4(b), nor does it violate subornation of perjury statutes such as 18
U.S.C. § 1622 (1994)."); see also infra notes 130-40 and accompanying text.
113. See Wydick, supranote 11, at 37 n. 112.
114.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(b) (2009).

115.

See id. ("A lawyer shall not.., counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely ....

116.

O.W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 459 (1897) ("A man who

cares nothing for an ethical rule which is believed and practised by his neighbors is likely
nevertheless to care a good deal to avoid being made to pay money, and will want to keep out of
jail if he can.").
117. See generally Salmi, supra note 2, at 148-54 for a discussion of "[c]onduct [t]hat [i]s
[c]learly [u]nethical." Ms. Salmi-referencing Professor Wydick's Grade One coachingdistinguishes four ways in which a lawyer can knowingly and overtly encourage a witness to
testify falsely:
[(1)] encourage[ing] the witness to make untrue statements .. .[(2)] instruct[ing] the
witness to claim a lack of memory or knowledge as to any question that the witness
does not want to answer ...[(3)] implying the acceptablity of false testimony ...[and

(4)] encourag[ing] the witness to evade answering a question or to provide evasive
answers to questions.
Id.at 148-54. For a case suggesting that a lawyer can be disciplined for advising a client to avoid
volunteering information, see Salmi, supra note 2, at 153 (discussing In re Complaint as to the
Conduct of A, 554 P.2d 479, 482 (Or. 1976), in which a lawyer counseled his client to avoid
volunteering certain information when the client answered a question about his mother's
whereabouts by merely naming a city, concealing the fact that she was buried in that city).

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 59:1

By contrast, Professor Wydick's account of what he designates as Grade
Two coaching-covert inducement of false testimony-ignores a critical
aspect of this part of the landscape. To many lawyers, the clearest example of
covert inducement of false testimony is the instance where a lawyer-by
stealth, indirection, or some other form of deception-attempts to induce a
witness (1) to doubt a previous memory and substitute one more favorable to
the case or (2) to adopt a belief about which he was initially unsure as a clear
memory.' 8 A classic example of such covert inducement occurs when counsel
for a plaintiff suffering bodily injury as a result of asbestos exposure manages
to persuade her witness that he really did see cartons of the defendant's
asbestos product on the factory floor when previously his memory had been
hazy. The lawyer does not ask the witness to perpetuate false testimony (as in
Professor Wydick's example of overt coaching in the first paragraph of this
subsection 1 9); to the contrary, she subtly (and effectively) tricks the witness
into substituting the lawyer's deceptive account for the witness's own genuine
memory.
Such coaching, however, is not what Professor Wydick meant when he
talked about covert inducement of false testimony-and, as will be shown, his
tripartite division of the forms of coaching does not account for it.' 20 Grade
Two coaching, according to Wydick, occurs when the lawyer does not
explicitly articulate her request for false testimony; rather, she sends a message
to the witness by implication.
The lawyer conveys the message that a
different memory will better serve the case, and the witness understands and
responds. The witness in this situation, however, is not tricked. The purpose
of proceeding this way, apparently, is to give the lawyer the ability to deny that
she requested that a witness testify falsely if the witness declines to cooperate
with the lawyer's implied message.' 22 Grade Two coaching is no different
from overt inducement of false testimony, except that it gives the lawyer, and
possibly the witness, what intelligence operatives call "plausible deniability."
It is, in short, ethically equivalent to an improper overt request, but with the
built-in defense to a disciplinary charge. Although Professor Wydick is
probably correct that these covert or indirect requests for false testimony are
less likely to be reported to courts and disciplinary authorities than overt

118. See Applegate, supra note 4, at 328-49; see also Salmi, supra note 2, at 157-59.
Professor Applegate distinguishes a category of witness coaching that Judge Frank calls
"inadvertent but innocent witness coaching" from the covert inducement of false testimony. Id. at
328 (quoting JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 86 (Princeton Univ. Press 1950) (1949)).
119. See supra text accompanying note 106.
120. See Wydick, supra note 11, at 18, 25, 37 (introducing Professor Wydick's three grades
of witness coaching).
121. Id. at 25 (explaining that "covert" inducement "is transmitted by implication").
122. Id. at 26 (suggesting that a lawyer may choose to construct false testimony to "save
face").
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requests for false testimony, 123 the lack of ease of detection does not change
the violation of the Anti-False Testimony Principle.
Professor Wydick does not mean to include the asbestos/Celotex situation, in
which the lawyer deceives the witness, in his Grade Two definition of covert
inducement. This omission is clear because he deliberately equates the moral
culpability of lawyer and witness in both Grades One and Two. He argues that
covert inducement witness coaching "is no less harmful than [overt witness
coaching] to the court's truth-seeking function, nor to the morals of the lawyer
and witness, nor is it any less serious a violation of disciplinary rules or
subornation of perjury statutes."'124 Although it is correct that the court's truth-

finding function is undermined equally whether a witness knows he is
testifying inaccurately or has been deceived by his lawyer into doing so, it is
not true that "the morals of the lawyer and witness" are the same in situations
in which the witness has been deceived by the lawyer into changing his
memory of what he perceived. 125 To the contrary, where the witness is
honestly deceived about the truth of his memories of his perceptions, it is
difficult to criticize him morally at all. This view is consistent with the
1 26
requirement that to commit perjury, a person must knowingly testify falsely.

On the other hand, where the witness and the lawyer are jointly engaged in a
verbal game to maintain plausible deniability about their efforts to present
inaccurate testimony to the court, their moral culpability is, as Professor
Wydick asserts, the same. 127 By equating the moral culpability of both lawyer
123. Id. at 27. The basis for this assumption is probably that covert requests would be less
likely to be reported because of insufficient evidence; a witness offended by his feeling that his
lawyer made an improper request would not have an explicit statement of improper nature to
which he could point. A witness in this situation may be more inclined to ignore the exchange
rather than report it.
124. Id.(emphasis added).
125. See id.A witness who knowingly testifies inaccurately is morally culpable. A witness
who is deceived into doing so by his lawyer is not. Wydick also thinks that the two types of
coaching vary on ease of detection. Id. Whether the examination is that of an opponent in a
deposition or of a witness on cross-examination at trial, the witness who believes himself to be
telling the truth may be better able to withstand questioning that challenges his interpretation than
one who is lying, for the simple reason that he genuinely believes that his testimony relays
accurate memories of his perceptions. A dishonest witness, on the other hand, faces the problem
of knowing the extent to which he needs to perjure himself in order to keep his story consistent.
126. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621-22 (2006).
127. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(5) (2009) (requiring that a lawyer
"consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer
knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or
other law"); see also id.at R. 4.1 (mandating "[t]ruthfulness [i]n [s]tatements [t]o [o]thers"). In
accordance with these rules, a lawyer owes her client a duty of candor-a duty, of course, that
extends to a witness who is the lawyer's client solely for the purpose of preparation for and
defense of a deposition. A reading of the Model Rules shows that there is a substantial moral
difference between the lawyer in the asbestos/Celotex case and the lawyer in Professor Wydick's
Grade Two coaching hypothetical. The lawyer who asks her witness to help out with false
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and witness, Professor Wydick fails to include in his definition of Grade Two
coaching the circumstance in which the lawyer manipulates an unassuming
witness into testifying inaccurately.
Nevertheless, it is clear that covert inducement of false testimony presents
an easy case, whether it is defined as Professor Wydick's Grade Two coaching
or to include the more subtle, but equally deceptive, coaching described above.
A lawyer acts improperly when she tries to induce false testimony, whether she
does so with or without an overt re uest and whether or not the witness
understands what the lawyer is doing.
2. Easy (But Not Quite So Easy) Cases
a. The Lawyer Induces the Witness to Change His Story Without Knowing
the Altered Testimony Is False

Professor Wydick describes what he calls Grade Three witness coaching as
follows:
Grade Three witness coaching is where the lawyer does not
knowingly induce the witness to testify to something the lawyer
knows is false, but the lawyer's conversation with the witness
nevertheless alters the witness's story. Unlike Grades One and Two,
Grade Three witness coaching is not grounds for lawyer discipline or
criminal prosecution for subordination of perjury. Grade Three
witness coaching lacks the element of corruption that Grades One
and Two have. It does, however, alter the witness's
1 29story, and can
thus interfere with the court's truth-seeking function.
Professor Wydick argues that while Grade Three witness coaching
"interfere[s] with the court's truth-seeking function," the lawyer who practices
it is nevertheless not subject to discipline under Model Rules 3.3(a)(3) or
3.4(b) when she induces her client to change his testimony. 130 Wydick bases
his Rule 3.4(b) argument on the language of the Rule that bars a lawyer from

testimony violates both the Rules of Professional Conduct and criminal law, whether she does it
overtly or in such a way as to preserve plausible deniability. See Wydick, supra note 11, at 18
n.48 (discussing a lawyer's culpability for suborning perjury under federal perjury statutes). At
least in this case, however, the lawyer is not attempting to deceive the witness. Where the lawyer
tries to manipulate the witness into believing an account of the historical record that the lawyer
knows is false, the lawyer is acting dishonestly toward both the court and her client.
128.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(b).

129. Wydick, supra note 11, at 37.
130. Id. at 37 n.1 12. At the time Professor Wydick wrote his article, the requirement now
contained in Rule 3.3(a)(3) appeared in Rule 3.3(a)(4); the enumeration was changed in the 2002
revisions. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT REPORTER'S EXPLANATION OF CHANGES R.

3.3 text n.3 (2009).
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"counsel[ing] or assist[ing] a witness to testify falsely."' 131 Wydick's argument
is that when a lawyer induces a witness to alter his story, she violates the
Model Rule 3.4(b) if, and only if, she knows that the alteration is false.' 3 2 On
its face, this is quite incongruous for two reasons: First, as Professor Wydick
concedes, when a lawyer alters a "witness's story," that conduct "interfere[s]
with the court's truth-seeking function."' 33 Second, it allows a lawyer to
defend against charges of misconduct by asserting that although she altered the
record and did not know whether the alteration was true, she did not know that
the alteration was false. This contradicts common sense and the underlying
thrust of the ethical rules, because it permits a deviation from the historical
record but fails to hold the lawyer to her duty of ensuring that the modification
is true. Speaking directly to lawyers, and contrary to Wydick's approach, one
commentator advised that "[o]ne ethical rule of thumb is, never suggest
unrecalled details of a relevant event that are anything other than what you
believe to be true."' 34 This is the correct approach. A lawyer can suggest
alterations to a witness's story only when she reasonably believes the alteration
is true. She cannot escape violation of the Anti-False Testimony Principle on
the ground that she did not know her proposed alteration was false.
Professor Wydick's interpretation of Model Rules 3.3(a)(3) and 3.4(b)
mocks one of the critical goals of the Anti-False Testimony Principle: to
present the court with a factual record that is as accurate as possible. A slight
modification of the hypothetical testimony used by Professor Wydick to
identify Grade One witness coaching illustrates the incongruity of his
conclusion. In Wydick's example, a lawyer asks a witness to testify that, at a
relevant time and place, P and D were fewer than 100 yards apart."' In the
first formulation of the example, the lawyer asks the eyewitness-who is P's
best friend-if he was in a position to observe the distance between the
parties.' 36 When the witness answers in the affirmative, the lawyer says: "Let
me be frank. In this lawsuit it would be very helpful to P if the distance
137
between P and D were less than 100 yards. Could you help us out on that?"'
13 1. See infra text accompanying notes 154-60 for a discussion of how this interpretation
ignores a clause in the text of Rule 3.4(b), which permits easy avoidance of this apparent paradox.
132.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(b).

133. Wydick, supra note 11, at 37.
134. Altman, supra note 12, at 41. Although Professor Wydick's description of Grade Three
coaching refers only to seeking testimony that the lawyer knows is false, his description of
"conversation[s] ... [that] alter[] the witness's story" as "coaching" makes it clear that he is not
talking about inadvertent comments by the lawyer that could alter testimony. Wydick, supra note
11, at 37. The lawyer's duty to avoid even such inadvertent changes in the witness's testimony is
encompassed by the approach set forth at the end of this subsection. See infra text accompanying
notes 156-60.
135. Wydick, supra note 11, at 19.
136. Id. at 19-20.
137. Id. at 20.
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The witness agrees to so testify. 138 Although Professor Wydick describes this
as an improper (Grade One) overt inducement of false testimony, the request
only falls into Grade One on the assumption that the testimony is false.139 If
the testimony is false, the impropriety of the lawyer's conduct is clear. 140 The
position is different, however, if the witness's testimony is true.
Let us consider two variations of Professor Wydick's scenario. Suppose,
first, that when the witness says he can help the lawyer with his testimony, he
does so because what the lawyer wants him to say is what he truthfully can
say. In this case, the witness replies to the lawyer's request for help: "Of
course I can say they were less than 100 yards apart, because that's the way I
saw it." Here, although the lawyer may have been indifferent to her ethical
obligations, she has committed no violation, because the witness will, in fact,
testify truthfully, based on his memory of what he saw.
Though the lawyer
may have been willing to deceive the court, the witness's testimony is not
deceptive because it honestly is accurate.
A second variation is more difficult and identifies the problem in Professor
Wydick's formulation of Grade Three coaching. Suppose, here, that following
her request for testimony that the distance between P and D was less than 100
yards, the lawyer says: "I don't care whether it's true or false. I only want you
to say it." Under Professor Wydick's approach, the lawyer has not committed
a violation because the lawyer does not know for certain that the testimony is
false. 142 This is not correct. Professor Wydick's approach is deficient because
it suggests that a lawyer has no duty to ascertain whether the changes in
testimony are accurate or not. What matters in assessing the lawyer's conduct,
however, is not that she knows the testimony she is seeking to elicit is false, but
rather that she is trying to alter the factual record. Such alteration, in itself,
may cause the witness to present inaccurate testimony to the court. 43
Expressing indifference as to whether the statement is true or false, the lawyer
shows her own indifference to her obligation to offer correct information in the
record. Failing to know that the testimony is false does not excuse her
conduct.
Let us step back for a moment because this is a critical issue. Lawyers are
free to discuss the factual record with their witnesses.144 They are not required
138. Id.
139.

See id.at 18.

140. See
141.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(b) (2009).
See id.; see also Wydick, supra note 11, at 19-20.

142. See Wydick, supra note 11, at 37.
143. See Altman, supra note 12, at 41 (noting that refreshing the recollection of the witness
during witness preparation may result in "seemingly flawless trial testimony" that "was not part
of the witness's initial memory").
144. See Applegate, supra note 4, at 304 ("In preparing a witness, a lawyer usually discusses
with the witness the factual context into which the witness's observations or opinions fit.
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to be passive receptors of what their witnesses say. 145 Lawyers are therefore
entitled to speak with witnesses and, implicitly, to alter what the witness would
have said absent the discussion with the lawyer. Such conversations may
occur, provided-and this is a critical provisio-that the alteration does not
produce testimony that is inaccurate and that the lawyer either knows it is
inaccurate or has not taken the trouble to verify its truth. 146 In short, lawyers
are not precluded from helping their witnesses better articulate their testimony
about their own perceptions. As Ms. Salmi explains: "A witness's perceptions
of critical events are easily eroded and distorted with time.
Witness
preparation should therefore help revive the witness's memory. 14 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has gone so far as to
say that a lawyer does nothing wrong when she tries, "even aggressively," to
persuade her witness that his initial recollection of the facts is not entirely
"complete or accurate." ' 148 It would be foolish to suppose that lawyers do not
regularly engage in such discussions with their witnesses. Our point, rather, is
that if lawyers are aware of their obligations under the Anti-False Testimony
Principle to avoid deceiving the court about the historical record, such
discussions are not unethical.
The correct rule governing such discussions with witnesses is more
restrictive than Professor Wydick's Grade Three coaching. That rule is that it
is the lawyer's duty to ensure that any alteration in the testimony that the
witness is prepared to give is one that the witness believes is truthful.149 While
it is certainly correct that a lawyer must avoid coercion, 15 this does not
describe her entire obligation. The lawyer must emphasize and re-emphasize
to the witness that the court is entitled to hear-and she, as counsel, has a duty
to present--only evidence that is accurate. 15 1 Thus, in discussing alterations of
Lawyers frequently inform witnesses of facts of which they were previously unaware by telling
the witnesses directly or by comparing the testimony of witnesses possessing similar knowledge.
There are compelling reasons for informing a witness of other views, and most commentators do
not question the practice.") (citation omitted).
145. See infra text accompanying notes 194-96 for a discussion of this point in connection
with a lawyer's suggesting alteration of a witness's choice of words to describe the witness's
perceptions.
146. Altman, supra note 12, at 39 ("To perform witness preparation ethically, you still must
evaluate the truth of the witness's prospective testimony.").
147. Salmi, supra note 2, at 157.
148. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Bright, 6 F.3d 336, 341 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Altman,
supra note 12, at 40 (discussing Resolution Trust).
149. See Altman, supra note 12, at 39 (emphasizing the importance of evaluating the
truthfulness of testimony).
150. See id.
(highlighting the importance of avoiding coercion).
151. See id.("Instructing the witness to tell the truth sets the stage for ethical witness
preparation. It helps build rapport with the witness by presenting [the lawyer] as a truth-seeking
professional who will not require anything unlawful, unethical, or beyond the witness's
capacity.")
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potential testimony, the lawyer must respect the witness's right to disagree 152
and must defer to the witness where he indicates that he cannot truthfully say
what the lawyer wishes he could say. 153 A lawyer is not excused from
attempting to alter testimony merely by "not knowing" that the altered
testimony is false, as Professor Wydick suggests. 154 She is justified in
permitting testimony to go forward if-and only if-she has met the burden of
establishing that the witness genuinely believes that any suggested changes in
his testimony are accurate and thus will not interfere with the court's truthseeking function. In short, such testing of a witness's version of events
promotes a back and forth that helps the lawyer to engage in the kind of truthdetecting that the duty to investigate ethically requires. 55
In addition to avoiding incongruous results, this approach is consistent with
Model Rule 3.4(b) and its mandate that "a lawyer shall not . . . falsify

evidence."' 156 This prohibition applies equally to both documentary (or other
tangible) evidence and to witness testimony.
Model Rule 3.4(b) fills the gap
(into which Professor Wydick fell 1 58) that appears to prevent a lawyer from
inducing a witness to alter his testimony only if the lawyer knows the
testimony is false.' 59 A lawyer who alters a document does not necessarily
make it "false." She simply changes it and, thereby, "interfere[s] with the
court's truth-seeking function."' 60 Only where the lawyer can establish to her
honest satisfaction that an alteration in a witness's testimony does not
"change" the testimony such that it ceases to be accurate can the lawyer
participate in or permit the introduction of such altered testimony. 161 Unless

152. See Resolution Trust, 6 F.3d at 342 (noting with approval the attorneys' practice of
permitting their witness to sign an affidavit only if the witness agreed with its contents).
153. See Altman, supra note 12, at 39 (advocating the practice of "requiring the witness[] to
reject any of the attorney's suggestions that would, in the witness's view, result in false
testimony").
154. See Wydick, supra note 11, at 37.
155. See, e.g., Altman, supra note 12, at 39 ("At a minimum, ethical witness preparation is a
dialogue framed by the[] joint obligations [of both lawyer and witness to ensure truthful
testimony].").
156. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(b) (2009).
157. See id. Rule 3.4(b) prohibits both falsification of evidence and assistance to witnesses
"to testify falsely." Id.
158. See Wydick, supra note 11, at 37 n. 112 (asserting that a violation of Rule 3.4(b) does
not occur when the lawyer does not know the testimony is false). Professor Wydick fails to
account for the entire Model Rules' definition of "know," specifically the sentence indicating that
"[a] person's knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.0(0. Indeed, a lawyer's knowledge may be inferred, and as such, lacking actual
knowledge of false testimony will not save a lawyer from a Rule 3.4(b) violation.
159. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(b).
160. Wydick, supra note 11, at 37.
161. See Altman, supra note 12, at 39.
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the lawyer can so satisfy herself, it is an easy case: such conduct violates the
Anti-False Testimony principle and is inappropriate.
b. The Lawyer Believes the Witness Means to Tell the Truth but the
Lawyer Knows the Testimony Is Wrong
A less common case occurs when (1) the lawyer herself has not intentionally
engaged in any overt or covert efforts to alter the witness's memory; (2) the
witness is recounting his memory of the events to which he is testifying as he
really remembers them, and the lawyer knows this; but (3) based on other
62
mistaken.
evidence, the lawyer strongly believes that the witness is factually
If the lawyer presents the witness's testimony, does she violate Model Rule
3.3(a)(3) by offering false testimony? One recent commentator seems to
maintain that a lawyer may offer evidence that she believes to be erroneous, at
least in the criminal defense context, provided that the witness genuinely
believes his testimony is accurate.1 63 While it is beyond the scope of this
Article to discuss whether this is a proper approach for a criminal defense
lawyer, we think that when applied in a civil context, such conduct creates an
easy case-it violates the Anti-False Testimony Principle.
According to Professor Margaret Raymond, "[a]s a matter of criminal
defense ethics" it may be appropriate to offer "mistaken alibi testimony, which
is truthful but erroneous, to create reasonable doubt., 164 As her only support
for this proposition, Professor Raymond cites James v. Illinois, a murder case
in which a defense witness testified, apparently on her honest belief, to a
proposition that defense counsel knew to be wrong.' 65 In James, the defendant
made a statement to the police explaining that he had his hair color and style
changed at his mother's beauty parlor after the killing but before his arrest; the
trial court later suppressed this statement as the product of an improper arrest
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 16 6 Notwithstanding knowledge of this
statement, defense counsel introduced an alibi witness at trial who testified that
on the day of the crime, the defendant's hair color was as it appeared in court
(black), and not the color (red) that five eyewitnesses testified was the color of
the murderer's hair.16 7 The question before the United States Supreme Court

162. See Applegate, supra note 4, at 309 (characterizing such testimony as "objectively false
but subjectively true testimony").
163. See Margaret Raymond, The Problem With Innocence, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 449, 458
(2001) (noting as acceptable the practice of allowing testimony that is "truthful but erroneous" in
order to cast reasonable doubt).
164. Id.at 458. In a footnote, Professor Raymond takes a stronger view, stating that a
defense lawyer is "obliged to" present such testimony, provided that she does not know the
testimony is untruthful. Id.at 458 n.38.
165. James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 310 (1990).
166. Id.at 309-10.
167. Id.at 310.
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was not the propriety of the alibi witness's testimony, but rather whether the
defendant's suppressed statement could be used to impeach the testimony of
the eyewitnesses.' 68 Overruling the Supreme Court of Illinois, the United
States Supreme Court held in a five to four decision that the suppressed
statements could not be used to impeach witnesses other than the defendant
himself.169 Although the majority did not address the issue, Justice Kennedy
suggested in his dissent that the introduction of such testimony was improper
because "[e]ven if the witness testifies in
good faith, . . . his lawyer, who
170
offer[ed] the testimony, kn[e]w the facts.'
Professor Raymond criticizes the dissent's view on the ground that it
"disregards the possibility that the testimony, while factually incorrect, was
nonetheless truthful, perhaps the product of mistaken recollection. As long as
the testimony was not known by the lawyer to be untruthful, counsel was not
only entitled to test the govemment's proof, he was obliged to."' 171 By her use
of the word "truthful," Professor Raymond appears to say that "truthful[ness]"
is determined solely by the subjective mental state of the witness-an
examination of the witness's intent, rather than the objective accuracy of the
statement. Thus, if the witness was truthful-not intending to lie--on his
subjective criterion, criminal defense counsel can and must present the
testimony even if (1) the testimony is, in fact, inaccurate, and (2) the lawyer
knows that the testimony is inaccurate.
Whatever particular rules may apply to a lawyer representing a criminal
defendant, we think it clear in the civil context that such conduct would be
unethical.1 72 The general purpose of the Anti-False Testimony Principle, and
of Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) in particular, is to ensure that the court receives an
accurate record on which to decide the case. 17 3 Of course, testimonial accounts
from different witnesses may vary, even if all witnesses are testifying to their
honest beliefs and memories, because people perceive and remember what they
perceive differently.
Yet, Professor Raymond's interpretation does not
168. Id. at313.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 326 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
171. Raymond, supra note 163, at 458 n.38. Note that this is different from Professor
Wydick's Grade Three formulation, criticized above. See supra text accompanying notes 13442. Wydick focused on whether the testimony itself was, in fact, inaccurate; Professor Raymond
would excuse the lawyer even if the lawyer believed that the witness was honestly mistaken. See
Raymond, supra note 163, at 458 n.38; Wydick, supra note 11, at 37.
172. As indicated, the James Court decided the question of the propriety of introducing
suppressed statements made by the defendant to impeach witnesses other than the defendant. See
James, 493 U.S. at 313. James did not decide that a criminal defense lawyer may introduce
testimony she knows to be inaccurate, nor did the majority opinion contain dicta that supported
that claim. Professor Raymond's article cites no authority that supports the argument that a
criminal defense lawyer may present testimony to the tribunal that she knows to be inaccurate.
173. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2009).

The Fundamentalsof EthicalPreparationof Deposition Witnesses

2009]

43

comport with Model Rule 3.3(a)(3). 7 4 The language of Model Rule 3.3(a)(3)
175
bars a lawyer from "offering evidence that the lawyer knows to be false."'
The focus is on the lawyer's knowledge, not the mental state of the witness; the
rule applies whether the witness is honest, dishonest, deluded, or mistaken, for
the rule imposes a duty on lawyers, not their clients. 76 Because the Rule's
purpose is to ensure that lawyers do not participate in placing testimony that
they know is inaccurate before the court, the good faith of a witness does not
alter that duty, nor does it undercut its rationale. 177 It is not relevant that our
moral assessment of a witness who mistakenly provides false testimony will be
quite different from that of a witness who does so intentionally.
The critical focus, therefore, must be on the lawyer's knowledge: if she
knows the testimony is false, it is an easy case-she cannot present the
testimony. The proper procedure when a lawyer knows that her witness is
honestly mistaken, therefore, is the same as when the lawyer believes that the
78
Where the
witness is lying: the lawyer must remonstrate with the witness.
witness believes he is telling the truth, as was the case in James,17 9 the lawyer
must confront the witness with the evidence that has convinced the lawyer that
the witness's perception or memory is inaccurate.' 80 If the witness's account
genuinely persuades the lawyer that the witness's version of the story may be
accurate, only then may the lawyer present the testimony with the view that if
the case goes to trial, it will be for the jury to decide the disputed question of

fact.'

81

c. A Lawyer Uses Her Right to Explain the Applicable Law to Her Client
to ProcureFalse Testimony
At the core of the lawyer's duty
discuss and explain the applicable
predicate to the lawyer's ability
advice to the client. Nevertheless,
which the lawyer explains the law

to communicate with her client is the duty to
law to the client. 82 Such an explanation is a
to fulfill her responsibility to render legal
there are circumstances where the manner in
to the client, as well as the timing of such an

174.

See id.; see also Raymond, supra note 163, at 458 n.38.

175.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (emphasis added).

176. Id. ("A lawyer shall not knowingly . . .offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be
false.").
177.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 8.

178. See, e.g., Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 169 (1986) ("It it universally agreed that at a
minimum the attorney's first duty when confronted with a proposal for perjurious testimony is to
attempt to dissuade the client from the unlawful course of conduct.").
179. See supra notes 166-69, 178 and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., Nix, 475 U.S. at 169 (ruling that a lawyer must "attempt to dissuade" her client
when she suspects the client may offer false testimony).
181.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3).

182. See id.at R. 1.2(d) (outlining an attorney's role in counseling her client to "make a good
faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law").
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explanation, is inappropriate. A lawyer cannot shroud her improper and covert
attempt to alter a witness's testimony about the historical record by claiming
that it is her duty to render legal advice to her client.' 8 3 By doing so, she
infringes upon the Anti-False Testimony Principle to the extent that her
discussion of the applicable law covertly induces the witness to say he
remembers what he would not have otherwise remembered but for his recently
obtained knowledge of the applicable law. The same is true regarding the
lawyer's ability to coach the witness covertly by the way she explains the facts
of the litigation.
This problem is highly textured.
Some client-witnesses are more
sophisticated than others and will recognize more readily from the lawyer's
discussion of the law what they "need to say" to prevail. Regardless of how
much the lawyer emphasizes the requirement that the witness tell the truth,
some client-witnesses will be more willing to lie to enhance their case than
others. Finally, some legal questions-and the facts needed to resolve such
questions-are more complex than others. One commentator discusses the
least problematic iteration of the issue. Focusing on asbestosis personal injury
litigation in which the witness is generally less sophisticated than the typical
in-house deputy general counsel of a corporation, Liisa Rende Salmi discusses
an attorney's "lecture on the law," which may "suggest" to the witness what
his testimony should be. 184 In her analysis, the critical issue is whether the
lawyer delivers her lecture before the witness has recounted the facts-which
may prompt the witness to mold his story to fit his understanding of the lawor after, when the witness's story already is "set." 185 Ms. Salmi cites an ethical
opinion of the Nassau, New York Bar that establishes the rule that the lawyer
may discuss applicable law with the client before hearing his version of the
facts "'as long as the attorney in good faith does not believe that the attorney is
participating in the creation of false evidence."' 1 86 As Ms. Salmi correctly
points out, however, "even an attorney acting in good faith really cannot know
how her lecture on the law will
alter the witness's story if she gives the lecture
'1 87
before she knows the facts."
Although this view may plausibly describe the relationship between lawyer
and litigant in a personal injury action where the result turns on the account of
a few discrete historical events, it fails to capture the dynamics between lawyer
and client or, in more complex matters, between lawyer and multiple
183. See id.
184. Salmi, supra note 2, at 154-56 ("[T]he asbestos litigant is most likely a factory worker
who does not fully know what the manufacturers actually did.").
185. Id.at 154-57 (describing this issue as one that creates "borderline" ethical issues); see
also Altman, supra note 12, at 41 ("One ethical rule of thumb is, never suggest unrecalled details
of a relevant event that are anything other than what you believe to be true.").
186. Id.at 157 (quoting Nassau Bar Ethics Op. No. 94-6 (1994)).
187. Id.
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representatives of a corporate client. In these cases, few lawyers view their
discussions with such clients as giving them cut-and-dry lectures on the
applicable law; rather, these discussions are more closely equated to back-andforth conversations, seeking active client input. As we will discuss in detail
below, when lawyers work with their clients to formulate understandings that
dovetail with appropriate legal positions,' 88 lawyers in commercial and
especially complex cases do not render legal advice by giving the client a
lecture. Instead, the lawyer's advice is the product of sustained attorney-client
dialogue, which sometimes continues through discovery as the other side's
position becomes known.
Thus, suppose that an insurance company is a defendant in a bad-faith tort
action. While the claims executives and claims handlers are likely to have a
general understanding of what a bad-faith action is, they may lack specific
knowledge of the elements needed to defend such an action in the relevant
jurisdiction. The lawyer may explain the standard of conduct required under
applicable law and then discuss with potential witnesses their actions and their
motivations for these actions. The client may respond to the lawyer's initial
comment by asking a question that focuses on particular conduct. Simply
stated, in such a case, admonishing counsel to listen to the client's story before
discussing the law is unrealistic. Lawyer-client dialogue, especially when
clients are corporations or other sophisticated consumers of legal services, is
neither simple nor a one-way street. The idea that a lawyer can discuss the law
with her client at any time-provided that she acts in good faith and refrains
from creating factually inadequate testimony-may be a useful after-the-fact
standard for a disciplinary proceeding where a judicial body must decide
whether someone was acting in good faith. The good-faith standard is not,
however, adequate as an ethical guideline for practitioners.
Lawyers require an ethical guideline that indicates to their witnesses that
telling the truth is essential. When lawyers are discussing the applicable law
with their witnesses, when they are discussing the facts, or when they are
engaging in any other aspect of witness preparation, sound practice requires
lawyers to emphasize at the outset-and repeat as preparation goes forwardthat telling the truth is critical, that the lawyer herself insists upon it, and that
not telling the truth is not an option. In so doing, the lawyer clearly establishes
the ethical landscape for her client and signals to that client that he should
never assume that the lawyer is indirectly trying to induce inaccurate
testimony. 189 Articulating this ethical framework has an auxiliary benefit for
the lawyer herself; lawyers frequently have the ability (though not the right)
188. SeePartV.C.1.
189. See Altman, supra note 12, at 39 ("Instructing the witness to tell the truth sets the stage
for ethical witness preparation. It helps build rapport with the witness by presenting you as a
truth-seeking professional who will not require anything unlawful, unethical, or beyond the

witness's capacity.").
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knowingly to manipulate their clients into providing favorable accounts of the
historical record, and they can also unknowingly practice self-deception. An
admonition to clients that truth-telling is essential may also serve to remind the
lawyer herself that although she may prefer a different historical record in
order to construct a stronger case, the record exists as it is, and she cannot
properly interfere with its honest presentation. Doing so would be an
unequivocal violation of her ethical duty.
Discussions with clients describing the legal landscape of their case may
thus present a situation that is almost as easy an ethical case as efforts to
procure inaccurate testimony or to present false evidence. Just as lawyers are
flatly precluded from falsifying the factual record,1 90 lawyers may not attempt
falsification by the indirect route of describing the applicable law in the hope
or expectation that witnesses will discern the strongest testimony on their
own. 19 In most jurisdictions, the values encompassed in the attorney-client
privilege and the duty of confidentiality' 92 are trumped by the lawyer's duty of
candor to the court. 93 Similarly, the values encompassed by the Anti-False
Testimony Principle trump the lawyer's duty to render legal advice to her
client. Lawyers have the duty to advise their clients on the applicable law, but
even with the strongest will in the world, supported by repeated admonitions
that false testimony is unacceptable, a lawyer cannot avoid the presentation of
false testimony by an intelligent and manipulative client who will employ his
lawyer's advice to build an account of the historical record that will make his,
or his company's case, more persuasive. It is easy to assert that the lawyer
cannot use her duty to render legal advice to procure false testimony; however,
it may be difficult in the real world for a well-intentioned lawyer to be certain
that her advice is not being used for that inappropriate end. Indeed, the
principle is easy; the application may be difficult.
3. A HardCase: Limitations on How Fara Lawyer May Go in Discussing a
Witness's Word Choice
Words matter. At the most basic level, because different words generally
have different meanings, a change in word choice can change meaning.
Sometimes the change in meaning can render proposed testimony inaccurate.
Words have color or nuance that may not change the strict meaning of the
word, but may instead affect the sense of what happened, which, as every trial
190.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a) (2009).

191.

See Salmi, supranote 2, at 156-57.

192.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (articulating the standards by which a

lawyer shall keep information confidential).
193. See id.at R. 3.3. In the District of Columbia, the reverse is true. A lawyer has a duty to
correct a material misstatement of law or fact "unless correction would require disclosure of
information that is prohibited by Rule 1.6." D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1) (2009)
(emphasis added).

2009]

The Fundamentals ofEthical Preparationof Deposition Witnesses

47

lawyer will attest, can affect what the jury will decide. 194 In a products
liability case where fatalities or serious injuries occurred after an airplane
crashed, for example, the plaintiffs' lawyer will likely want to describe the
event as a "crash," or a "disaster," while counsel for the defendantmanufacturer will try to use words such as "accident" or "mishap." Further,
apart from jury perception, the choice of words with the same apparent
meaning but different nuance can affect the content of a witness's description
of observed facts. As Professor Wydick notes, "[s]uggestive questions can
produce ... dramatic effects. For instance, the questioner's choice of verbs to
describe two cars coming into contact (for example, 'hit' vs. 'smashed') can
influence the witness's testimony about how fast the cars were actually
going."' 95 For this reason, a lawyer's suggestion that a witness alter his196
choice
of words can amount to (covert) efforts to procure inaccurate testimony.
The extent to which a lawyer may suggest that the witness alter his choice of
words to describe his perceptions presents a difficult ethical question. In such
a case, the lawyer is explicitly trying to change her witness's testimony. The
question is whether the change alters the baseline description of what was
perceived-the correspondence to the witness's genuine memory of the facts
he perceived-in a way that compromises the court's truth-seeking function.
Is an airplane crash the same as an airplane accident? Is hitting a car the same
as smashing into a car? Is the testimony about the "underlying reality"
different? Is one description closer to the verifiable fact than the other? The
answer is both yes and no. Clearly, most counsel have preferences regarding
word choice, because they think their suggestions may tilt the case in their
clients' direction, even if only marginally.
To understand the delineation between a lawyer's ethically appropriate and
ethically inappropriate efforts to alter a client's word choice in his description
of past events, it is important to bear the following distinction in mind. The
applicable rules themselves forbid false testimony in the sense of deceptive
inaccuracy.197 Thus, where the testimony concerns the historical record, the
rules only require that lawyers not interfere with witness testimony about their
actual memories of what they perceived, such that the report of those
perceptions would be inaccurate. The rules from which the Anti-False
Testimony Principle is derived do not require that the witness's own word
choice describing the memories of those perceptions be treated as sacred. In
other words, the underlying reality of what was perceived and the words used
to describe that reality need not be perfectly congruent.

194. See Salmi, supra note 2, at 160 ("[M]any legal scholars are concerned with how an
attorney's suggested word choice can affect the jury's perception of the testimony.").
195. Wydick, supra note 11, at 10.
196. See Salmi, supra note 2, at 160-63.
197.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4.
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Concerning the nature and amount of evidence available for the court, there
is nothing wrong with a lawyer doing everything possible to improve the
client's chance of winning, provided that "everything" does not include
falsifying evidence. Indeed, that is one of the essential principles of advocacy.
To call a simple fender-bender a "crash" may be impermissibly stretching a
description, but to label a collision that caused significant personal injury and
property damage a "crash" probably is accurate. It is a mistake to seek more
198
certainty in a subject than the subject permits, as Aristotle warned long ago.
That same admonition is applicable here, yet there is no bright line that will
invariably delineate what lawyers can and cannot do in these situations. It is
logically impossible to state in the abstract where a change of words falsifies
testimony and where it does not. Instead, the crucial question that must always
be considered is whether the change falsifies testimony such that the truthseeking function of the court is compromised. That is why this is the difficult
question.
The appropriate solution lies in the dialogue between attorney and client,
and, more particularly, in the structure of that dialogue. Lawyers and their
clients should interact with one another not simply to try to win the case (or
secure the best settlement possible in a bad case), but as partners seeking the
best possible outcome that is permitted while acting with integrity. The
appropriate way to define the dialogue is by establishing a truth-telling ground
rule for testimony. To reiterate what one practitioner succinctly said:
"Instructing the witness to tell the truth sets the stage for ethical witness
preparation. It helps build rapport with the witness by presenting you as a
truth-seeking professional who will not require anything unlawful, unethical,
or beyond the witness's capacity. ' 199 Constrained by the rule that lawyers
200
must convey to their clients that untruthfulness is never a legitimate option,
lawyers should discuss with their clients whether changing the client's word
choice is consistent with truth-telling. Only the witness can know whether the
word change accurately describes his perception, and thus he-not the
lawyer-must make the final decision about changing the language.
Suppose that a client is about to be deposed in an automobile accident case
in which he is the plaintiff. In telling his story in the preparation meeting, the
client describes the events as "the accident." The savvy plaintiffs' lawyer asks,
"Would you say that it was a collision?" "Well, sure," replies the witness.
"Our two cars did collide." At this point, the lawyer may ask: "Would you be
comfortable calling this a collision?" If the witness says "yes," it is difficult to
198. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 3 (Sir David Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1998) (1925) ("[l~t is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things
just so far as the nature of the subject admits .... ").
199. Altman, supra note 12, at 39. Elsewhere, Mr. Altman describes this approach as an
"appeal to the witness's commitment to the truth." Id. at 42.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 26-30.
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question the lawyer's behavior from an ethical standpoint. The witness saw
what he saw and has been reminded that he is obligated to testify truthfully to
He can (and must) testify to what he remembers
what he remembers.
perceiving-for example, what his eyes saw, what his ears heard, and the way
his brain processed the sense data. The word choice describes what the
witness perceived, but it is not actually what he perceived. If he believes that
the word "collision" accurately reports what he remembers perceiving, his
testimony is not false. There is rarely, if ever, a single, unique word that
precisely describes each perception. That is simply not the way language
works. 2 0 1 If the witness in our automobile hypothetical is comfortable with
describing the "accident" as a "collision," he may so testify. He is telling the
202
truth and his lawyer has not asked him to do otherwise.
Suppose, however, that the lawyer takes her effort to "improve" the
testimony one step further. Suppose that she asks the witness whether he
would be willing to describe the event as a "crash." The witness tells the
lawyer that he isn't comfortable with her suggestion. Although there may not
be a single unique word or phrase that the witness believes could alone
describe his (memory of his) perception, this does not mean that any word
chosen by a person who did not share the perception would seem right to the
witness.2 °3 Where the witness declines the lawyer's suggested wording, the
lawyer must respect the witness's statement and defer to his word choice.
A 1979 District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics opinion emphasizes that
notwithstanding the overriding principle that while "a lawyer may not prepare,
or assist in preparing, testimony that he or she knows, or ought to know, is
false or misleading ... a lawyer may properly suggest language as well as the
substance of testimony." 2° 5 The opinion distinguishes between testimonial
201.

See L.S. VYGOTSKY, THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE 124-25 (Eugenia Hoffman & Gertrude

Vakar trans., MIT Press 1979) (1962) (discussing the relationship between thought and speech).
202. See Hodes, supra note 11, at 1364 ("Suppose, then, that suggestions from counsel
enhance the effectiveness of the witness's communication, without enhancing its accuracy. So
long as the material eventually presented is still truthful, and at least not less accurate than the
pre-horseshedding version, why should that be beyond the bounds of the law?").
203. Note, of course, that we are talking about one witness. Another person may also have
seen the accident, and that person might be willing to use a word that the first eyewitness would
not wish to use. Both witnesses may have seen the same event, but each has his or her own
individual perception-and a sense of what word fairly and honestly captures it.
204. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text. While it probably would not violate
Rule 3.4(b)'s prohibition against falsifying evidence or assisting a witness to testify falsely to
inquire why the witness is unwilling to follow the lawyer's suggestion, such inquiries go too far
where they violate the premise that, at the end of the day, the witness must testify to his
perceptions, in whatever language he-and not his lawyer-chooses to describe them. See id
205. D.C. Bar Op. No. 79, at 138 (1979). Continuing, the Legal Ethics Committee opined
that "the particular words in which testimony ... is cast ... has no significance so long as the
substance of that testimony is not... false or misleading." Id. at 139 (emphasis added); see also

Salmi, supra note 2, at 161 (stating that an attorney "may ethically instruct her witness to choose
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substance and resulting nuance, and suggests that "differences in nuance
among variant phrasings of the same substantive point [can be] so significant
as to make one version misleading while another is not. ' ' 2 06 The lawyer herself
may have-indeed, probably does have-an opinion about whether one
phrasing of a description is more likely to appeal to the jury than another. The
critical point, however, is that only the witness, reminded of and constrained
by his obligation to tell the truth, can determine whether a particular
phraseology is misleading. The lawyer cannot make this decision on behalf of
the witness, because the perception was not hers. The witness must decide
which of the various verbal formulations accurately reflects his memory of his
perception of the historical record. A clear formulation of the applicable
ethical standard, therefore, is to say the following: having emphasized the
importance of truth-telling to the witness, the lawyer may suggest wordings to
the witness as options for describing the events, and this may include
suggestions about nuance that could potentially tilt the case in favor of the
lawyer's client. Ultimately, however, the lawyer must accept the witness's
formulation and accept that, because it is the witness who is testifying under
oath, it is the witness who must
be the ultimate judge of which words reflect
20 7
what he remembers perceiving.
certain words ... as long as the ultimate testimony remains truthful"). So far as we have been
able to find, no subsequent ethics opinion in the District of Columbia or elsewhere discusses this
issue.
206. Id. at 139; see also Piorkowski, supra note 11, at 402 (noting the same distinction,
though his emphasis is whether "the factual meaning of testimony has been altered" by a different
choice of words). Although one could define "fact" so as to encompass an entire account of
events, the word sometimes has a narrower, more barebones meaning. Mr. Piorkowski's example
is whether a defendant "hit" or "beat" a victim. In a battery case, one could plausibly say that the
fact in question is the striking of the plaintiff by the defendant, but the difference in nuance
between the words "hit" and "beat," while factually accurate, may be sufficiently misleading to
make a witness uncomfortable with using one word or another at counsel's suggestion. In that
case, the witness's choice, and the witness's comfort, must control.
207. Although a lawyer may ethically try to discern why the witness is uncomfortable with
using a suggested wording, it seems clear that the lawyer may not try to influence the witness to
adopt her proposed wording because it will strengthen the client's case. While the lawyer and the
witness-who may be the client or a friend of the client-may ethically work to come up with the
most persuasive true formulation of a description of events that took place, it can never be a good
reason for a lawyer to ask her witness to use a formulation which he feels is misleading, and
hence untruthful, because it will strengthen the case. Cf Salmi, supra note 2, at 146 (stating, in
the context of discussing the legal effect of answers with a witness, that the lawyer may not
provide the witness with a "cash-incentive" to tailor his answers in a particular way). Mr. Altman
proposes a three-step process: "First, scrutinize the extent to which the witness's original
characterization is supported by subsidiary evidence; second, propose an alternate
characterization of that evidence; and, third, convince the witness that all the evidence supports
the alternate characterization better than the original characterization." Altman, supra note 12, at
42. While it would be desirable if the suggested formulation better fits the evidence than the
original characterization, we think that the Anti-False Testimony Principle is not compromised if
the witness, made aware of his duty to tell the truth, is comfortable that the proposed formulation
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C. Ethical Duties of Lawyers in PreparingWitnesses to Testify About Present
Understandings
Lawyers notice depositions of opposition witnesses to lock in their accounts
of their past perceptions and past mental states. Where witnesses' past actions
are at issue, lawyers also want to discover-and lock in-the way those
witnesses will explain or justify those actions. Such explanations and
justifications, if they are weak and unpersuasive, will strengthen the lawyer's
own case. If they are powerful and coherent, they will help the lawyer advise
her client about the risks of trial and an appropriate settlement. During the
deposition, well-prepared witnesses may use examining counsel's questions to
parry the lawyer's questions by justifying what they did and the reasons for
their actions, even if the questions did not directly call for such responses.
Depositions of third-party witnesses-although less frequent in this respectcan be used for the same purposes. If the case involves transactions in which
rights and duties stem from the parties' agreement, examining counsel will
attempt to discover and subsequently discredit the witness's interpretations
about contractual language or industry practices. If it is a tort case or a case
arising from a statute imposing general duties on any member of the public, the
examining lawyer will seek to determine how key actors explain, excuse, or
justify past actions. Such explanatory testimony falls into the category we call
testimony about present understandings.
As demonstrated, such testimony about present understandings differs from
testimony about the historical record, which involves the import of information
from the external world and past mental states into the record or into the
courtroom. From the court's point of view, such testimony constitutes the
208
vehicle to determine--or to get as close as possible to-the verifiable facts.
To state it another way: there is (or was) something "out there" in the world
that witnesses know and remember, and when testifying, they relay their
perceptions of what that "something" is. Regarding that information, the
lawyer's job is twofold. First, the lawyer must connect and apply the true facts
to the law. Second, the lawyer must present the account of that information in
such a way that her opponent will realize the strength of her case so that a
favorable settlement is possible-or, if agreement cannot be reached, in such a
way that will maximize the likelihood of winning at trial. In simple terms, the
lawyer must try to show both that her client's version of what happened is
more accurate than that of her opponent and that the facts she can prove mesh
with each element of the causes of action or defenses needed to prevail. It
follows that the duty not to present false testimony is, metaphorically speaking,
that the lawyer must not even attempt what ancient alchemists sought to do: to
accurately reports his memory of his perception. The reformulation, in short, does not have to be
a "better" account of his perception.
208.

See supra Part V.
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turn base metal into gold. Thus, to summarize, the Anti-False Testimony
Principle commands that the accounts in the historical record be accurate-not
manufactured to gain litigation advantage.
Testimony about present understandings is not testimony about facts that are
"out there" in the world and constituting a part of the historical record.
Testimony about present understandings reflects mental states here and now, in
the midst of litigation. The Anti-False Testimony Principle is applicable to
such testimony as well, but only in the limited sense that when a witness states
what his present understanding is, he must not lie.
Where present
understandings are concerned, there is no external body of historical facts of
which an accurate account must be given.
To the contrary, present
understandings typically form critical parts of current litigation positions.
While they can devastate a case if contrary to past events, present
understandings do not communicate the perceptions or memories of those
events. The difference between these two types of testimony prompts the
critical distinction regarding the operation of the Anti-False Testimony
Principle: while lawyers cannot help clients change their memories of
historical perceptions, lawyers are not falsifying the record when they help
their clients formulate their present understandings. Indeed, helping clients to
formulate such understandings is an integral part of what litigators are hired to
do.
The distinction applies whether the lawyer's client in litigation is a natural
person or an organization (such as a corporation), although the analysis is
particularly important in the case of an organization where the entity itself is
incapable of having its own present understanding in the way a natural person
can. Some individual or group of individuals must formulate what will count
as the organization's explanations, justifications, and excuses, and the obvious
persons to perform this task are the lawyers hired by the organization to
represent it in the litigation.
To illustrate the application of the principle to present understandings, we
begin with the case where the client is an individual, natural person. We then
move to the situation where the client is a corporation or other non-natural
person. Such cases present an additional wrinkle-that each corporate official
may have a different present understanding out of which counsel will be
obligated to create the "corporate position" in a piece of litigation.
1. Individual Clients: Preparingthe Case and Preparingthe Party Witness
to Testify
Suppose that a surviving wife sues a cardiac surgeon for medical malpractice
that allegedly occurred during an operation in which her husband died. With
the support of competent expert testimony, she alleges that during the
procedure an unusual problem arose-a problem known as "P." In response to
P, the surgeon took a series of steps which may be collectively called "S." S
failed, and the patient died. In preparing to defend the doctor, the lawyer, who
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is a specialist in medical malpractice, specifically cardiac problems, examines
a number of treatises and articles in the medical literature. Suppose she
discovers that while there is some professional authority that recommends S
when P arises during surgery, certain authors say that S is inappropriate and
that, instead, the operating surgeon ought to takes steps "T." Suppose further
that, in the minds of these authorities, the choice between S and T turns on
certain ways in which P manifests itself during surgery.
In preparing her case, the lawyer knows what happened at the time in
question: the doctor took steps S. While discussing the matter with the
surgeon, she also learns that the doctor has a precise memory of what he
thought at the time P occurred, including why he chose to do S. The historical
record is thus clear, and the lawyer has confirmed that her client understands
his duty to testify accurately about what he perceived, what he did, and what
he thought during surgery. Both the lawyer and her client understand,
however, that mounting a plausible defense requires constructing a position
defending the doctor's choice of S. If they cannot do so, the chance of
succeeding before a jury will be slim, meaning that a settlement figure
approaching plaintiff's full demand must be considered. If, on the other hand,
in the defendant-doctor's deposition and in the reports and depositions of
experts, the testimony can persuasively defend the doctor's choice of S, both
settlement prospects and the likelihood of a favorable jury verdict improve
markedly. Success in the sense of achieving a favorable rather than an
unfavorable settlement will critically turn on the defendant-doctor's direct
defense of his choices in the operating theater-for example, whether he is
able to convincingly explain that, based on his professional understanding, his
choices on the day in question were correct. This defense will constitute his
present understanding of why those choices were correct.
The constraints on lawyers who are preparing cases and witnesses who are
preparing to testify about the historical record are not present here. The doctor
will testify under oath, meaning that he is bound to be truthful and thus cannot
say that his present understanding is something other than what it is. To that
extent, the Anti-False Testimony Principle applies; however, the truthfulness
of the content of that present understanding is not ethically constrained by past
events or past understanding. 20 9 In developing his present understanding of his
choices in the operating room during the surgery in question, the doctor is free
to consider any alternative ways of understanding his choices: he is permitted
to read and consider the literature on the subject, and he may consult other
surgeons. The only constraint upon such reading and consultation is that, if
asked in his deposition, the doctor must disclose these additional references.
209. A witness testifying about his present understandings, of course, may be strongly
constrained by his past understandings in the sense that an inexplicable change in position could
open him up to devastating cross-examination and thus weaken his position. This, however, is a
strategic constraint rather than an ethical constraint.
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More importantly, the doctor would likely engage in conversations with his
lawyer---conversations that would have a strong impact on the doctor's present
understandings. It is a lawyer's job to prepare her client's case; it is her job to
translate a medical judgment into a legal defense. A lawyer would be
permitted to consult with her client on his understanding of the choice between
S and T during the course of the surgery; in fact, it would likely be malpractice
for her to fail to do so.
During the lawyer's preparation of her doctor-witness before his deposition,
nothing will be more important than developing a coherent account of his
present understanding of what he should have done during the surgery, thereby
explaining his actions during the surgery. In working with her client to
formulate his testimony about why he chose to take steps S rather than T,
lawyer and client may develop a few options. In an effort to explain away the
alleged malpractice, they can take a position that justifies the choice of S ("S
was really the better choice because . . . .") or that explains the choice of S ("S
seemed to be the right choice because the patient presented P in such and such
a way."). In working to formulate their ideal, the doctor and the lawyer are not
unconstrained; for example, they are limited by the relevant medical literature
and the opinions of the members of the professional specialty. These limits,
however, are not ethical constraints. To repeat, the only ethical constraint is
that the witness cannot offer as his present understanding that which does not
actually constitute his present understanding. Adhering to this standard of
truthfulness, a lawyer can and should help her client develop the justifications
and explanations for his conduct that are necessary to mount a successful
defense. It is for this reason that she was hired.
The contrast between testimony of present understandings and testimony
about the historical record is thus apparent. With present understandings, there
are no facts "out there" in the world to which the testimony must conform. In
a case about what happened (or what one's mental state was) in the past, the
lawyer may only work within the confines of what witnesses remember. There
may be a number of things that a lawyer would ideally want her witness to say,
but that simply cannot be said because doing so would be untruthful. Where
the witness, like our hypothetical doctor, truthfully testifies as to his present
understanding, the question of whether the testimony adheres to the factual
record does not arise. From this it follows that the lawyer is not "counsel[ing]
or assist[ing] a witness to testify falsely" 210 when she engages in a dialogue
with her client designed to formulate and frame the explanation that the
witness will offer. The important point for our purposes, therefore, is as
follows: lawyer and client are free to develop whatever present understanding
explanation that they want; they are only ethically constrained by the fact that
their position must be one that the doctor can truthfully take. Their
210.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(b) (2009).
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formulation of the doctor's litigation position, including what his testimony
will be, is not limited by the numerous constraints imposed on testimony about
the historical record by the Anti-False Testimony principle.
2. Corporate:Preparingthe Case and PreparingWitnesses to Testify
Representation of a corporation or other entity21 1 adds another ingredient to
the mix because Model Rule 1.13(a) provides that "[a] lawyer employed or
retained by an organization represents the organizationacting through its duly
authorized constituents. ' 2 12 A consequence of this requirement is the apparent
anomaly that when a lawyer speaks to persons who choose to retain her, direct
her work, pay her bills, and to whom she is responsible for the satisfactory
handling of the matter, she is not speaking to her clients; rather, she is speaking
to agents of her organizational client. In this situation, the attorney-client
privilege is applicable to such conversations between lawyer and agents of her
client, 213 but in the event of a conflict of interest arising between the
organization and the individual, the lawyer owes her duty to the organization
itself.2 14 Only these agents can testify about "the corporate position" with
respect to its present understandings or the historical record. Although our
concern in this section is testimony about present understandings, conflict of
interest problems can arise when lawyers are preparing their corporate
witnesses. Such problems often arise with regard to anticipated testimony
about events in the historical record and about present understandings when
215
witnesses testifying on behalf of the organizational client disagree.
Although it requires a brief return to testimony about the historical record, we
first consider conflicts arising from inconsistent testimony about the historical
record before returning to preparation of testimony about present
understandings.

211. For the sake of convenience, we use the term "corporation" in this discussion to
encompass not only corporations properly so called but also other organizations. We do this
because corporations are the most commonly represented and the first named of various
organizations in Rule 30(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-the rule governing the
depositions of such organizations. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6).
212.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (emphasis added).

213. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397 (1981) (ruling that the
attorney-client privilege extends to communications between the lawyer and certain employees of
the client corporation beyond the corporation's "control group").
214. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13; see also In re Conduct of Campbell,

202 P.3d 871, 878 (Or. 2009) ("When a lawyer represents a corporation, the lawyer represents,
for the purpose of conflict of interest analysis, the entity, not the person who manages the
entity.").
215. By "corporate witnesses," we mean officers and employees whose testimony will be
sought in cases in which their corporate employer is a party. This term is not confined to
witnesses designated to testify on behalf of the corporation under Rule 30(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6).
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a. Reconciling Testimony of Corporate Witnesses Concerningthe
HistoricalRecord
In representing her corporate client in litigation, the last thing an attorney
will want to learn is that two corporate employees each have different and
inconsistent memories of the historical record. This problem can arise where
the issue concerns perceptions of events. Suppose that a company let time slip
away in pursuing a cause of action against a general contractor for defective
workmanship on its building. Under applicable law, the question of whether
the statute of limitations has run depends on the time that the cause of action
accrued, which, in turn, depends on when company officials discovered cracks
in the cement floor.
Two company employees--"Arnold" and "Blake"--agree that they first saw
the cracks together during a routine inspection of the physical plant. There is
no evidence that anyone saw the cracks before they did. Arnold says: "I know
that the inspection occurred on June 14, because that's my daughter's birthday,
and I remember that I had to get home for her party." Blake, just as
confidently says: "The inspection took place on June 21. It couldn't have been
June 14 because I left early that day to head to a meeting in Chicago, and I
know I did not leave my office before I went to the airport." Suppose the
statute of limitations ran on June 17, two years later. If Arnold's account is
correct, the statute has run and the cause of action is barred; if Blake's account
is accurate, the case is timely. In preparing for the hearing on defendant's
motion to dismiss on the ground that the statute of limitations had run,
corporate-plaintiff's counsel is strongly constrained by the Anti-False
Testimony Principle, because the issue involves the historical record.
While the lawyer may certainly probe Arnold's testimony to ensure that his
memory is accurate, 216 she cannot ask him to testify falsely or intimate that it
would be in the company's best interest for him to say that he was not sure
whether he saw the cracks during an inspection on June 14.217 Because the
company's lawyer must assume that the defendant will depose Arnold, or, if no
discovery is allowed on the motion, call him to testify if she fails to examine
Arnold, she will be forced to construct her case by arguing why Blake's
account is more reliable. The company has hired the lawyer to construct and
advance its litigation position, but if Arnold honestly believes that he is correct
about the date on which he saw the crack, counsel must construct the
company's position around Arnold's damaging contradictory testimony. The
Anti-False Testimony Principle permits no other course.

216. See Salmi, supra note 2, at 140 ("It is appropriate to prepare a witness because usually
several years have passed since the events in question. The attorney therefore should refresh the
witness's recollection of the facts and familiarize the witness with relevant documents.").
217. Id.at 153-54.
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A similar problem arises where a case presents an issue turning on the
historical question of "a company's understanding" of a term in the contract at
the time the contract was signed. A non-natural person like a corporation
cannot, in a literal sense, have an understanding. Only its agents can have
present understandings, but in certain circumstances, such understandings can
be attributed to the corporation. 2 18 For example, at the time a company entered
into a contract, if all of its agents understood that a particular contract
provision had the same meaning, then that part of the historical record is fixed,
and the lawyer is constrained by it. Suppose, however, that the corporate
officials had different understandings at the time of contract formation.
Suppose that completion of a construction project is delayed because of a
strike among employees of a supplier of key raw materials. Now, during
litigation, one or more corporate officials remembers thinking at the time the
agreement was made that a strike in a supplier's factory would excuse late
performance, and another remembers thinking that it did not. Here, the
situation is identical to the situation in which different corporate witnesses
have irreconcilable memories about the occurrence of an event in the physical
world, such as the discovery of a crack in a building that caused a claim for
defective workmanship to begin to accrue. This is so because in both
scenarios, counsel will have to select the account that is more favorable and
that she thinks she can better defend in order to develop a strategy that explains
away or minimizes the significance of the damaging account, assuming that
opposing counsel elicits the contradictory testimony. To the extent that she
cannot reconcile such accounts, her case will be weaker, thus diminishing the
settlement value of her case.
b. Lawyer Involvement in the Creation of Corporate Understandings
A lawyer developing a litigation strategy for a corporate or other
organizational client does so in the same way as when the client is an
individual. Where a part of the case is the client's current understanding of a
legal provision, the safety of action that was taken, an explanation of past
conduct, or something else, lawyer and client work together to create a position
that works for the litigation as a whole. This strategy, however, is contingent
on the standard that when testifying in deposition(s) or at trial, the client or, in
the corporate case, client representatives, honestly believe(s) that the testimony
is true.
218. This is the essence of the "corporate deposition" contemplated by Rule 30(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, wherein the corporation must name "one or more officers,
directors, or managing agents" to testify as the voice of the corporate entity, with the corporation
bound by that designated persons' testimony. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6); see also State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. New Horizont, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 203, 212 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (holding that "the
testimony of the Rule 30(b)(6) designee is deemed to be the testimony of the corporation itself"
and that such testimony is binding, although not in the sense of a judicial admission).
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The difference between the corporate case and the individual client case is
the possibility that when an organization is the client, differing views from the
organization's agents must be reconciled to create a coherent litigation
position. In the individual medical malpractice case, the physician-witness can
testify to any present understanding that he has, regardless of how he arrived at
it. He may well have an understanding-in the sense of an explanation or a
justification-soon after the event and before litigation against him has
commenced. Or he may develop it in thinking through, with counsel, how to
defend the medical malpractice case. In a case on behalf of a company, on the
other hand, it is the task of the lawyer to formulate the company's position
based on what happened or what the contract says (if there is one), as well as
on what corporate officials think about the situation. A corporation frequently
will not articulate the position it will take in litigation-whether it is the
claimant or the defendant-until the lawyer it has hired has commenced
working on the case. Indeed, one of the reasons that counsel is hired is to take
the lead in formulating the corporation's position.
When representing a corporate client, however, a lawyer can only create a
coherent litigation position to the extent that the accounts of various corporate
officials whose opinions matter can be rendered in a coherent and consistent
form. 2 19 However-and this is the crucial difference between the historical
record and present understandings-the lawyer preparing the part of the case
that concerns explanations or justifications need not begin with what her
clients tell her, as she must do when the historical record is concerned. An
experienced medical malpractice defense lawyer may have a good idea about
what a surgeon should have done in the operating theater, but she is still,
medically speaking, a layperson. This is not so in many complex commercial
cases. Corporations hire lawyers to create a legally sound and factually
plausible case. This fact is particularly true in contract litigation, especially
complex commercial contract litigation. Where contract terms or post-hoc
understandings of past actions are at issue, the lawyer representing a
corporation or other organization has (or may have) a problem in addition to
the problems faced by the medical malpractice lawyer and her doctor-client
while explaining earlier actions in light of the doctor's present understanding.
The problem is that more than one voice can speak for the corporation. In an
effort to create an inconsistency in the organization's position, opposing
counsel will use depositions to attempt to induce some company employees to

219. Which corporate officials' understandings matter turns upon what is at issue in the case.
While the understandings of senior executives are likely to be highly influential, such executives
are frequently not the persons whose understandings actually matter. Senior executives, while "in
charge," might have had little or nothing to do with the negotiation of the contract whose terms
are now at issue, or making the safety decision upon which the company's liability turns.
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express their individual understandin
s and explanations differently from the
22
way in which other employees have.
While preparing their corporate witnesses to testify-whether the witnesses
will testify as fact witnesses in their individual capacity or as corporate
designees under Rule 30(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or under
similar state procedural provisions-lawyers may work with their clients to
formulate the position the corporation will take in litigation. For example,
lawyers and clients will develop present understandings of the dispute: in this
contract dispute, this is our understanding of why we are entitled to damages
when a construction project was delayed by a strike, or in this products liability
litigation, this is why we believe we are correct to have made the safety
choices we made regarding a product whose defects are at issue. By attending
to the distinction between testimony about the historical record and testimony
about a witness's present post-hoc understandings, however, it is easy to see
that in preparing to respond to this anticipated tactic, company lawyers do not
face the same ethical challenges that they face when confronted with
conflicting accounts of the historical record. Lawyers do not violate the AntiFalse Testimony Principle when they work with the employees of
organizational clients to construct those portions of their clients' litigation
positions that depend on present understandings.

VI. CONCLUSION
Two ideas inform the central thesis of this Article. The first is that the
different rules governing a lawyer's ethical duties when preparing a witness
combine to reflect a single, underlying moral premise. That premise, which we
call the Anti-False Testimony Principle, prompts the lawyer to distinguish
sharply between testimony that is inaccurate because of human error and
testimony that is inaccurate as a result of a lawyer's deception. Although the
application of the Principle can create thorny problems in certain fact
situations, as we explored in Part V, the Principle's basic thrust is simple: a
lawyer may not deceptively offer or permit a witness to offer inaccurate
testimony to improve the record to benefit her client. 2 2 1 We have focused our
220. There is a further limitation on the application of the Anti-False Testimony Principle
where organizational clients are concerned. A corporate designee witness pursuant to a rule such
as Rule 30(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, at least in theory, can testify to an
understanding that is not his understanding. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6). That is because he
speaks as the organization and when questioned about "what is your understanding of' a
particular term in the contract, or about "your understanding of certain safety trials," the word
"your" refers to the organization-not the individual witness. See id. Because a Rule 30(b)(6)
witness can be asked questions about his personal knowledge or understandings (for example)
and his lawyer cannot instruct him not to answer the question on that ground, a lawyer takes a
severe tactical risk when she asks a corporate designee to testify to "corporate understandings"
with which the witness personally does not agree.
221.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(b) (2009).
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attention on deposition practice because testimony about the historical record
is typically given in the first instance, and hence locked in, during depositions.
This focus, however, does not imply that the Anti-False Testimony principle
does not apply in civil trials or criminal proceedings-it most certainly does.
The second central idea of this Article is the distinction between testimony
about the historical record and testimony about present understandings. This
distinction is particularly important in deposition practice because deposition
examination is not limited by the rules that determine admissibility at trial. 2
Although present understandings can sometimes be admissible at trial-for
example, when a doctor defends a malpractice claim by explaining why he
made a particular choice during surgery 23-present understandings are
common fodder in depositions, regardless of admissibility at trial. Planning to
weigh the strength of their case with an eye toward either settlement or the
possibility of prevailing on summary judgment, lawyers want to know how the
opposing party (or key witness testifying on behalf of the opposing party)
understands the major issues in the case. While witnesses testifying about
present understandings are constrained by the Anti-False Testimony Principle
to the extent that they cannot lie about what they offer as their understanding,
witnesses testifying about present understandings are not burdened by the
prohibition on falsifying accounts of verifiable facts that are, in principle, "out
there," namely the description of what they remember perceiving or thinking at
some point in historical time.
When preparing a witness for deposition about the historical record, that
record-through the Anti-False Testimony Principle-constrains the lawyer.
Helping a witness think about the facts, consider word choice, and evaluate
alternatives does not violate the ethical rules, provided that the lawyer keeps
this Principle and its underlying moral premise in mind. If the lawyer does
this, she will not cross the line into unacceptable manipulation of witness
testimony. The lawyer has wide latitude within the Anti-False Testimony
Principle in working with witnesses to formulate their present understandings.
Such understandings are a critical part of the lawyer's performance of the task
for which she was retained: to develop the client's case ethically in a manner
that will maximize the client's chance to achieve the best outcome, given the
constraints of verifiable facts in the historical record.

222. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (dictating that discovery sought in a deposition need not be
admissible at trial, but rather, it need only be "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence").
223. See supra Part V.C.1.

